ID: 3616
Date: 22/05/2008
Title: 3616 - Release of three Cisco security advisories
Platform level affected:Hardware
Hardware components affected:Network Router/Switch/Modem
Specific operating systems components affected: Cisco IOS
Remediation Summary:Update your copy of the software with the download available from the supplier.
Vendors affected:Cisco
Applications affected:IOS Secure Shell; Unified Customer Voice Portal; Service ControlEngine
Adversity source: Unknown
Attack Vector: Vulnerability exploitation
Virulence: Unknown
Warning Status: Unknown
Potential Damage: Network DOS
Possible Duration: Unknown
Availability of fix: Available
Type of fix: Patch
Source: Cisco
Reliability of source: Trusted
Abstract: Details of three Cisco security advisories detailing vulnerabilities in Cisco IOS Secure Shell, Cisco Unified Customer Voice Portal and Service ControlEngine.
Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco IOS Secure Shell Denial of Service Vulnerabilities
Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20080521-ssh
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080521-ssh.shtml
Revision 1.0
For Public Release 2008 May 21 1600 UTC (GMT)
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary
=======
The Secure Shell server (SSH) implementation in Cisco IOS contains multiple vulnerabilities that allow unauthenticated users the ability to generate a spurious memory access error or, in certain cases, reload the device.
The IOS SSH server is an optional service that is disabled by default, but its use is highly recommended as a security best practice for management of Cisco IOS devices. SSH can be configured as part of the AutoSecure feature in the initial configuration of IOS devices, AutoSecure run after initial configuration, or manually.
Devices that are not configured to accept SSH connections are not affected by these vulnerabilities.
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) identifier CVE-2008-1159 has been assigned to this vulnerability.
This advisory is posted at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080521-ssh.shtm
Affected Products
=================
Vulnerable Products
+------------------
Cisco devices running certain 12.4-based IOS releases and configured to be managed via SSH may be affected by this issue.
The IOS secure shell server is disabled by default. To determine if SSH is enabled, use the show ip ssh command.
Router#show ip ssh
SSH Enabled - version 2.0
Authentication timeout: 120 secs; Authentication retries: 3
The previous output shows that SSH is enabled on this device and that the SSH protocol major version that is being supported is 2.0. If the text "SSH Disabled" is displayed, the device is not vulnerable.
Possible values for the SSH protocol version reported by IOS are:
* 1.5: only SSH protocol version 1 is enabled
* 1.99: SSH protocol version 2 with SSH protocol version 1
compatibility enabled
* 2.0: only SSH protocol version 2 is enabled
For more information about SSH versions in IOS, please check the following URL:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios/12_3t/12_3t4/feature/guide/gt_ssh2.html
The SSH server is not available in all IOS images. Devices that do not support SSH are not vulnerable. Please consult the table of fixed software in the Software Version and Fixes section for the specific 12.4-based IOS releases that are affected.
To determine the software running on a Cisco product, log in to the device and issue the show version command to display the system banner. Cisco IOS software will identify itself as "Internetwork Operating System Software" or simply "IOS". The image name will be displayed between parentheses on the next line of output followed by "Version" and the IOS release name. Other Cisco devices will not have the show version command or will give different output.
The following example identifies a Cisco product running IOS release
12.4(17):
Cisco IOS Software, C2600 Software (C2600-ADVENTERPRISEK9-M), Version 12.4(17),
RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc1)
Technical Support: http://www.cisco.com/techsupport
Copyright (c) 1986-2007 by Cisco Systems, Inc.
Compiled Fri 07-Sep-07 16:05 by prod_rel_team
ROM: System Bootstrap, Version 12.2(8r) [cmong 8r], RELEASE SOFTWARE (fc1)
Router uptime is 1 week, 5 hours, 5 minutes
System returned to ROM by power-on
System image file is "flash:c2600-adventerprisek9-mz.124-17.bin"
Additional information about Cisco IOS release naming is available at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/620/1.html
Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
+--------------------------------
Cisco devices that do not run IOS are not affected.
Cisco IOS devices that do not have the SSH server feature enabled are not affected.
IOS-XR images are not affected.
The following IOS release trains are not affected:
* 10-based releases
* 11-based releases
* 12.0-based releases
* 12.1-based releases
* 12.2-based releases
* 12.3-based releases
IOS releases prior to 12.4(7), 12.4(13d)JA, and 12.4(9)T are not affected by this vulnerability.
No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these vulnerabilities.
Details
=======
Secure shell (SSH) was developed as a secure replacement for the telnet, ftp, rlogin, rsh, and rcp protocols, which allow for the remote access of devices. The main difference between SSH and older protocols is that SSH provides strong authentication, guarantees confidentiality, and uses encrypted transactions.
The server side of the SSH implementation in Cisco IOS contains multiple vulnerabilities that allow an unauthenticated user to generate a spurious memory access or, in certain cases, reload the device. If the attacker is able to reload the device, these vulnerabilities could be repeatedly exploited to cause an extended Denial of Service (DoS) condition.
A device with the SSH server enabled is vulnerable.
These vulnerabilities are documented in Cisco Bug IDs:
* CSCsk42419 ( registered customers only)
* CSCsk60020 ( registered customers only)
* CSCsh51293 ( registered customers only)
Vulnerability Scoring Details
=============================
Cisco is providing scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0.
Cisco will provide a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks.
CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response.
Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding CVSS at
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html
Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at
http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss
* CSCsk42419 - SSHv2 spurious memory access
CVSS Base Score - 7.8
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - None
Integrity Impact - None
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
* CSCsk60020 - SSHv2 spurious memory access
CVSS Base Score - 7.8
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - None
Integrity Impact - None
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
* CSCsh51293 - Spurious memory access when SSH packets received
CVSS Base Score - 7.8
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - None
Integrity Impact - None
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
Impact
======
Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities may result in a spurious memory access or, in certain cases, reload the device potentially resulting in a DoS condition.
Software Versions and Fixes
===========================
When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution.
In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center ("TAC") or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance.
Each row of the Cisco IOS software table (below) describes a release train and the platforms or products for which it is intended. If a given release train is vulnerable, then the earliest possible releases that contain the fix (the "First Fixed Release") and the anticipated date of availability for each are listed in the "Rebuild"
and "Maintenance" columns. A device running a release in the given train that is earlier than the release in a specific column (less than the First Fixed Release) is known to be vulnerable. The release should be upgraded at least to the indicated release or a later version (greater than or equal to the First Fixed Release label).
For more information on the terms "Rebuild" and "Maintenance,"
consult the following URL:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/620/1.html
IOS releases prior to 12.4(7), 12.4(13d)JA, and 12.4(9)T are not affected by this vulnerability.
+----------------------------------------+
| Major | Availability of Repaired |
| Release | Releases |
|------------+---------------------------|
| Affected | First Fixed | Recommended |
| 12.0-Based | Release | Release |
| Releases | | |
|----------------------------------------|
| There are no affected 12.0 based |
| releases |
|----------------------------------------|
| Affected | First Fixed | Recommended |
| 12.1-Based | Release | Release |
| Releases | | |
|----------------------------------------|
| There are no affected 12.1 based |
| releases |
|----------------------------------------|
| Affected | First Fixed | Recommended |
| 12.2-Based | Release | Release |
| Releases | | |
|----------------------------------------|
| There are no affected 12.2 based |
| releases |
|----------------------------------------|
| Affected | First Fixed | Recommended |
| 12.3-Based | Release | Release |
| Releases | | |
|----------------------------------------|
| There are no affected 12.3 based |
| releases |
|----------------------------------------|
| Affected | First Fixed | Recommended |
| 12.4-Based | Release | Release |
| Releases | | |
|------------+-------------+-------------|
| | 12.4(13f) | |
| | | |
| | 12.4(16b) | |
| 12.4 | | 12.4(18b) |
| | 12.4(17a) | |
| | | |
| | 12.4(18) | |
|------------+-------------+-------------|
| | Only 12.4 | |
| | (13d)JA and | |
| | 12.4(13d) | |
| | JA1 are | |
| 12.4JA | vulnerable, | 12.4(16b) |
| | all other | JA3 |
| | 12.4JA | |
| | releases | |
| | are not | |
| | affected. | |
|------------+-------------+-------------|
| 12.4JK | Not | |
| | Vulnerable | |
|------------+-------------+-------------|
| 12.4JMA | Not | |
| | Vulnerable | |
|------------+-------------+-------------|
| 12.4JMB | Not | |
| | Vulnerable | |
|------------+-------------+-------------|
| 12.4JMC | Not | |
| | Vulnerable | |
|------------+-------------+-------------|
| 12.4JX | Not | |
| | Vulnerable | |
|------------+-------------+-------------|
| 12.4MD | Not | |
| | Vulnerable | |
|------------+-------------+-------------|
| 12.4MR | 12.4(16)MR2 | 12.4(16)MR |
|------------+-------------+-------------|
| 12.4SW | 12.4(15)SW1 | 12.4(15)SW1 |
|------------+-------------+-------------|
| | 12.4(9)T6 | |
| | | |
| | 12.4(11)T4 | |
| 12.4T | | 12.4(15)T5 |
| | 12.4(15)T2 | |
| | | |
| | 12.4(20)T | |
|------------+-------------+-------------|
| 12.4XA | Not | |
| | Vulnerable | |
|------------+-------------+-------------|
| 12.4XB | Not | |
| | Vulnerable | |
|------------+-------------+-------------|
| 12.4XC | Not | |
| | Vulnerable | |
|------------+-------------+-------------|
| 12.4XD | Not | |
| | Vulnerable | |
|------------+-------------+-------------|
| | Vulnerable; | |
| 12.4XE | first fixed | 12.4(15)T5 |
| | in 12.4T | |
|------------+-------------+-------------|
| | Vulnerable; | |
| 12.4XF | first fixed | 12.4(15)T5 |
| | in 12.4T | |
|------------+-------------+-------------|
| 12.4XG | Not | |
| | Vulnerable | |
|------------+-------------+-------------|
| | Vulnerable; | |
| 12.4XJ | first fixed | 12.4(15)T5 |
| | in 12.4T | |
|------------+-------------+-------------|
| | Vulnerable; | |
| 12.4XK | first fixed | 12.4(15)T5 |
| | in 12.4T | |
|------------+-------------+-------------|
| 12.4XL | Not | |
| | Vulnerable | |
|------------+-------------+-------------|
| 12.4XM | Not | |
| | Vulnerable | |
|------------+-------------+-------------|
| 12.4XN | Not | |
| | Vulnerable | |
|------------+-------------+-------------|
| 12.4XQ | Not | |
| | Vulnerable | |
|------------+-------------+-------------|
| 12.4XT | Not | |
| | Vulnerable | |
|------------+-------------+-------------|
| 12.4XV | Vulnerable; | |
| | contact TAC | |
|------------+-------------+-------------|
| 12.4XW | 12.4(11)XW6 | 12.4(11)XW6 |
|------------+-------------+-------------|
| 12.4XY | Not | |
| | Vulnerable | |
|------------+-------------+-------------|
| 12.4XZ | Not | |
| | Vulnerable | |
+----------------------------------------+
Workarounds
===========
If disabling the IOS SSH Server is not feasible, the following workarounds may be useful to some customers in their environments.
Telnet
+-----
Telnet is not vulnerable to the issue described in this advisory and may be used as an insecure alternative to SSH. Telnet does not encrypt the authentication information or data; therefore, it should only be enabled for trusted local networks.
VTY Access Class
+---------------
It is possible to limit the exposure of the Cisco device by applying a VTY access class to allow only known, trusted hosts to connect to the device via SSH.
For more information on restricting traffic to VTYs, please consult:
http://cisco.com/en/US/products/sw/iosswrel/ps1835/products_command_reference_chapter09186a00800873c8.html#wp1017389
The following example permits access to VTYs from the 192.168.1.0/24 netblock and the single IP address 172.16.1.2 while denying access from anywhere else:
Router(config)# access-list 1 permit 192.168.1.0 0.0.0.255
Router(config)# access-list 1 permit host 172.16.1.2
Router(config)# line vty 0 4
Router(config-line)# access-class 1 in
Different Cisco platforms support different numbers of terminal lines. Check your device's configuration to determine the correct number of terminal lines for your platform.
Infrastructure ACLs (iACL)
+-------------------------
Although it is often difficult to block traffic transiting your network, it is possible to identify traffic that should never be allowed to target your infrastructure devices and block that traffic at the border of your network. Infrastructure ACLs are considered a network security best practice and should be considered as a long-term addition to good network security as well as a workaround for this specific vulnerability. The ACL example shown below should be included as part of the deployed infrastructure access-list, which will protect all devices with IP addresses in the infrastructure IP address range.
A sample access list for devices running Cisco IOS is below:
!--- Permit SSH services from trusted hosts destined
!--- to infrastructure addresses.
access-list 150 permit tcp TRUSTED_HOSTS MASK INFRASTRUCTURE_ADDRESSES MASK eq 22
!--- Deny SSH packets from all other sources destined to infrastructure addresses.
access-list 150 deny tcp any INFRASTRUCTURE_ADDRESSES MASK eq 22
!--- Permit all other traffic to transit the device.
access-list 150 permit IP any any
interface serial 2/0
ip access-group 150 in
The white paper titled "Protecting Your Core: Infrastructure Protection Access Control Lists" presents guidelines and recommended deployment techniques for infrastructure protection access lists.
This white paper can be obtained here:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/tech/tk648/tk361/technologies_white_paper09186a00801a1a55.shtml
Control Plane Policing (CoPP)
+----------------------------
The Control Plane Policing (CoPP) feature may be used to mitigate these vulnerabilities. In the following example, only SSH traffic from trusted hosts and with 'receive' destination IP addresses is permitted to reach the route processor (RP).
Note: Dropping traffic from unknown or untrusted IP addresses may affect hosts with dynamically assigned IP addresses from connecting to the Cisco IOS device.
access-list 152 deny tcp TRUSTED_ADDRESSES MASK any eq 22
access-list 152 permit tcp any any eq 22
!
class-map match-all COPP-KNOWN-UNDESIRABLE
match access-group 152
!
!
policy-map COPP-INPUT-POLICY
class COPP-KNOWN-UNDESIRABLE
drop
!
control-plane
service-policy input COPP-INPUT-POLICY
In the above CoPP example, the ACL entries that match the exploit packets with the "permit" action result in these packets being discarded by the policy-map "drop" function, while packets that match the "deny" action are not affected by the policy-map drop function.
CoPP is available in Cisco IOS release trains 12.0S, 12.2SX, 12.2S, 12.3T, 12.4, and 12.4T.
Additional information on the configuration and use of the CoPP feature can be found at the following URL:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/iosswrel/ps6537/ps6586/ps6642/prod_white_paper0900aecd804fa16a.html
Obtaining Fixed Software
========================
Cisco has made free software available to address this vulnerability for affected customers. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment.
Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-license-agreement.html, or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml
Do not contact either "psirt@cisco.com" or "security-alert@cisco.com"
for software upgrades.
Customers with Service Contracts
+-------------------------------
Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/
Customers using Third-party Support Organizations
+------------------------------------------------
Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreement with third-party support organizations such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory.
The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed.
Customers without Service Contracts
+----------------------------------
Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but who do not hold a Cisco service contract and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful at obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should get their upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.
* +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
* +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
* e-mail: tac@cisco.com
Have your product serial number available and give the URL of this notice as evidence of your entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC.
Refer to http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml
for additional TAC contact information, including special localized telephone numbers and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages.
Exploitation and Public Announcements
=====================================
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability described in this advisory.
This vulnerability was discovered by Cisco internal testing and customer service requests.
Status of This Notice: FINAL
============================
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors.
Distribution
============
This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080521-ssh.shtml
In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients.
* cust-security-announce@cisco.com
* first-teams@first.org
* bugtraq@securityfocus.com
* vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org
* cisco@spot.colorado.edu
* cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net
* full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
* comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com
Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates.
Revision History
================
+---------------------------------------+
| Revision | | Initial |
| 1.0 | 2008-May-21 | public |
| | | release. |
+---------------------------------------+
Cisco Security Procedures
=========================
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html
This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt
********************************************************************************************
Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco Voice Portal Privilege Escalation Vulnerability
Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20080521-cvp
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080521-cvp.shtml
Revision 1.0
For Public Release 2008 May 21 1600 UTC (GMT)
Summary
=======
A vulnerability exists in the Cisco Unified Customer Voice Portal (CVP) where an authenticated user can create, modify, or delete a superuser account. Cisco has released free software updates that address this vulnerability.
This advisory is posted at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080521-cvp.shtml.
Affected Products
=================
Vulnerable Products
+------------------
CVP software versions prior to 4.0(2)_ES14 for the 4.0.x release,
4.1(1)_ES11 for the 4.1.x release, and 7.0(1) for the 7.x release are vulnerable.
Note: CVP systems running software release 3.x are not vulnerable.
Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
+--------------------------------
CVP systems running software release 3.x are not vulnerable. CVP systems running version 7.0(1) or later are not vulnerable. No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by this vulnerability.
Details
=======
Cisco Unified Customer Voice Portal (CVP), which is part of Cisco Customer Interaction Network solution, provides customer voice and video self-service integration. Using CVP, organizations can provide intelligent, personalized self-service over the phone, allowing customers to efficiently retrieve the information they need from the contact center.
There are three different user roles within CVP: superuser, administrator, and read-only access. A vulnerability exists in CVP where a user with an administrator role can create, modify, or delete a superuser account, which has greater system privileges.
This vulnerability is documented in the Cisco Bug ID CSCsj93874 and has been assigned Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2008-2053.
Vulnerability Scoring Details
+----------------------------
Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerability in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0.
CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response.
Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks.
Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding VSS Cat
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html.
Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at
http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss.
* Possible to create & delete superuser accounts from user
accounts (CSCsj93874)
CVSS Base Score - 9.0
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - Single
Confidentiality Impact - Complete
Integrity Impact - Complete
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 7.4
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
Impact
======
Successful exploitation of the vulnerability may result in full control of the system.
Software Versions and Fixes
===========================
This vulnerability is fixed in the Cisco Unified Customer Voice Portal
(CVP) software version 4.0(2)_ES14 for the 4.0.x release, 4.1(1)_ES11 for the 4.1.x release, and 7.0(1) for the 7.x release.
CVP software version 4.0(2)_ES14 can be downloaded from:
http://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/36833091037661f49ad8152368c22bbf
CVP software version 4.1(1)_ES11 can be downloaded from:
http://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/946b57654c80187da8c3cfc0aa02866e
When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution.
In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance.
Workarounds
===========
There are no workarounds for this vulnerability.
Obtaining Fixed Software
========================
Cisco has released free software updates that address this vulnerability. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment.
Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/prod_warranties_item09186a008088e31f.html,
or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml.
Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades.
Customers with Service Contracts
+-------------------------------
Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/.
Customers using Third Party Support Organizations
+------------------------------------------------
Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory.
The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed.
Customers without Service Contracts
+----------------------------------
Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.
* +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
* +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
* e-mail: tac@cisco.com
Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC.
Refer to http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml
for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages.
Exploitation and Public Announcements
=====================================
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerability described in this advisory.
This vulnerability was found during internal product testing.
Status of this Notice: Final
============================
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors.
Distribution
============
This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080521-cvp.shtml
In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients.
* cust-security-announce@cisco.com
* first-teams@first.org
* bugtraq@securityfocus.com
* vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org
* cisco@spot.colorado.edu
* cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net
* full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
* comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com
Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates.
Revision History
================
+------------------------------------------------------------+
| Revision 1.0 | 2008-May-21 | Initial public release. |
+------------------------------------------------------------+
Cisco Security Procedures
=========================
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html.
This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
Copyright 2007-2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
Updated: May 21, 2008 Document ID: 100933
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
********************************************************************************************
Cisco Security Advisory: Cisco Service Control Engine Denial of Service Vulnerabilities
Advisory ID: cisco-sa-20080521-sce
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080521-sce.shtml
Revision 1.0
For Public Release 2008 May 21 1600 UTC (GMT)
Summary
=======
Three Secure Shell (SSH) vulnerabilities exist in the Cisco Service Control Engine (SCE) that may result in system instability or a reload of the SCE. The first vulnerability may be triggered during SSH login activity that is conducted within aggressive time frames. The second vulnerability may be triggered with normal SSH login activity in combination with other SCE management actions occurring simultaneously.
The third vulnerability may be triggered during SSH login and is specific to the usage of unique invalid authentication credentials.
Cisco has made free upgrade software available to address these vulnerabilities for affected customers. There are no workarounds for these vulnerabilities.
Note: These vulnerabilities are independent of each other; a device may be affected by one vulnerability and not by the others.
This advisory is posted at
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080521-sce.shtml.
Affected Products
=================
Vulnerable Products
+------------------
The SCE 1000 and 2000 series devices are affected by the following vulnerabilities if the SSH server on the SCE is enabled:
* System vulnerability to SSH login activity - affects SCE software
versions prior to 3.1.6.
* SSH login activity leads to illegal Input/Output operations -
affects SCE software versions prior to 3.0.7 and 3.1.0.
* SCE SSH authentication sequence anomaly - affects SCE software
versions prior to 3.1.6.
Note: The SCE SSH server is disabled by default.
To determine whether you are running a vulnerable version of Cisco Service Control Operating System (SCOS) software, issue the "Show Version" command-line interface (CLI) command. The following example shows a Cisco SCE that runs software release 3.1.6:
SCE2000#>show version
System version: Version 3.1.6 Build 157
Build time: Mar 31 2008, 18:58:49 (Change-list 303626)
Software version is: Version 3.1.6 Build 157
Products Confirmed Not Vulnerable
+--------------------------------
No other Cisco products are currently known to be affected by these vulnerabilities.
Details
=======
Cisco SCE 1000 and 2000 series devices provide high-capacity advanced application-level bandwidth optimization, stateful application inspection, session-based classification and control of network traffic. The SCE solution allows for the detection and control of network applications including: web browsing, multimedia streaming, and peer-to-peer (P2P).
This Security Advisory describes multiple distinct vulnerabilities.
These vulnerabilities are independent of each other.
* System vulnerability to SSH login activity
A vulnerability impacting the SCE SSH server may be triggered during SSH login activity, resulting in system instability or a reload of the SCE.
Specific SSH processes may encounter temporary resource unavailability if called within aggressive intervals.
This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCsi68582 and has been assigned Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) ID CVE-2008-0534.
* SSH login activity leads to illegal Input/Output operations
A second vulnerability exists in the SCE SSH server that may be triggered with normal SSH traffic to the SCE management interface occurring in conjunction with other management tasks. During this event, an illegal IO operation may impact the SCE management agent, requiring a reboot of the SCE to recover management access.
This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCsh49563 and has been assigned CVE ID CVE-2008-0536.
* SCE SSH authentication sequence anomaly
A third vulnerability exists in the SCE SSH server that may also be triggered during the SSH login process but unrelated to login attempt frequency or other concurrent management tasks. This issue is triggered by the usage of specific SSH credentials that attempt to change the authentication method, resulting in an authentication sequence anomaly impacting system stability.
This vulnerability is documented in Cisco Bug ID CSCsm14239 and has been assigned CVE ID CVE-2008-0535.
Vulnerability Scoring Details
+----------------------------
Cisco has provided scores for the vulnerabilities in this advisory based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). The CVSS scoring in this Security Advisory is done in accordance with CVSS version 2.0.
CVSS is a standards-based scoring method that conveys vulnerability severity and helps determine urgency and priority of response.
Cisco has provided a base and temporal score. Customers can then compute environmental scores to assist in determining the impact of the vulnerability in individual networks.
Cisco has provided an FAQ to answer additional questions regarding VSS at
http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/intelligence/cvss-qandas.html.
Cisco has also provided a CVSS calculator to help compute the environmental impact for individual networks at
http://intellishield.cisco.com/security/alertmanager/cvss.
* System vulnerability to SSH login activity (CSCsi68582)
CVSS Base Score - 7.8
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - None
Integrity Impact - None
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
* SSH login activity leads to illegal I/O operations (CSCsh49563)
CVSS Base Score - 7.8
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - None
Integrity Impact - None
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
* SCE SSH authentication sequence anomaly (CSCsm14239)
CVSS Base Score - 7.8
Access Vector - Network
Access Complexity - Low
Authentication - None
Confidentiality Impact - None
Integrity Impact - None
Availability Impact - Complete
CVSS Temporal Score - 6.4
Exploitability - Functional
Remediation Level - Official-Fix
Report Confidence - Confirmed
Impact
======
Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities may result in the loss of management access or, in some cases, cause vulnerable SCE devices to reload.
Software Versions and Fixes
===========================
When considering software upgrades, also consult http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt and any subsequent advisories to determine exposure and a complete upgrade solution.
In all cases, customers should exercise caution to be certain the devices to be upgraded contain sufficient memory and that current hardware and software configurations will continue to be supported properly by the new release. If the information is not clear, contact the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC) or your contracted maintenance provider for assistance.
The following list contains the first fixed software release for each
vulnerability:
+---------------------------------------+
| | Affected | First |
| Vulnerability | Major | Fixed |
| | Release | Release |
|------------------+----------+---------|
| System | 1.x | 3.1.6 |
|vulnerability to |----------+---------|
| SSH login | 2.x | 3.1.6 |
|activity |----------+---------|
| | 3.x | 3.1.6 |
|------------------+----------+---------|
| | 1.x | 3.0.7 |
|SSH login |----------+---------|
| activity leads | 2.x | 3.0.7 |
|to illegal IO |----------+---------|
| operations | 3.x | 3.0.7, |
| | | 3.1.0 |
|------------------+----------+---------|
| | 1.x | 3.1.6 |
|SCE SSH |----------+---------|
| authentication | 2.x | 3.1.6 |
|sequence anomaly |----------+---------|
| | 3.x | 3.1.6 |
+---------------------------------------+
SCOS software version 3.1.6 contains the fixes for all vulnerabilities described in this document.
SCOS software is available for download from the following location on
cisco.com:
http://www.cisco.com/pcgi-bin/tablebuild.pl/scos?psrtdcat20e2
Workarounds
===========
There are no workarounds for these vulnerabilities.
Filtering SSH traffic with Access Control Lists (ACLs) to affected SCE devices on the SCE management interface or on screening devices can provide a mitigation technique for these vulnerabilities. Restricting SCE SSH management interface access to only trusted devices through the use of SCE ACLs or Transit ACLs is strongly recommended.
Additional information about SCE ACLs is available in the "Configuring the Management Interface and Security" section of the SCE Software Configuration Guide:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/ps6134/products_configuration_guide_chapter09186a00808498b9.html#wp1060396
Additional information about tACLs is available in Transit Access Control Lists: Filtering at Your Edge:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/tech/tk648/tk361/technologies_white_paper09186a00801afc76.shtml
Obtaining Fixed Software
========================
Cisco has released free software updates that address these vulnerabilities. Prior to deploying software, customers should consult their maintenance provider or check the software for feature set compatibility and known issues specific to their environment.
Customers may only install and expect support for the feature sets they have purchased. By installing, downloading, accessing or otherwise using such software upgrades, customers agree to be bound by the terms of Cisco's software license terms found at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/prod_warranties_item09186a008088e31f.html,
or as otherwise set forth at Cisco.com Downloads at http://www.cisco.com/public/sw-center/sw-usingswc.shtml.
Do not contact psirt@cisco.com or security-alert@cisco.com for software upgrades.
Customers with Service Contracts
+-------------------------------
Customers with contracts should obtain upgraded software through their regular update channels. For most customers, this means that upgrades should be obtained through the Software Center on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/.
Customers using Third Party Support Organizations
+------------------------------------------------
Customers whose Cisco products are provided or maintained through prior or existing agreements with third-party support organizations, such as Cisco Partners, authorized resellers, or service providers should contact that support organization for guidance and assistance with the appropriate course of action in regards to this advisory.
The effectiveness of any workaround or fix is dependent on specific customer situations, such as product mix, network topology, traffic behavior, and organizational mission. Due to the variety of affected products and releases, customers should consult with their service provider or support organization to ensure any applied workaround or fix is the most appropriate for use in the intended network before it is deployed.
Customers without Service Contracts
+----------------------------------
Customers who purchase direct from Cisco but do not hold a Cisco service contract, and customers who purchase through third-party vendors but are unsuccessful in obtaining fixed software through their point of sale should acquire upgrades by contacting the Cisco Technical Assistance Center (TAC). TAC contacts are as follows.
* +1 800 553 2447 (toll free from within North America)
* +1 408 526 7209 (toll call from anywhere in the world)
* e-mail: tac@cisco.com
Customers should have their product serial number available and be prepared to give the URL of this notice as evidence of entitlement to a free upgrade. Free upgrades for non-contract customers must be requested through the TAC.
Refer to http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/687/Directory/DirTAC.shtml
for additional TAC contact information, including localized telephone numbers, and instructions and e-mail addresses for use in various languages.
Exploitation and Public Announcements
=====================================
The Cisco PSIRT is not aware of any public announcements or malicious use of the vulnerabilities described in this advisory.
The SSH login activity vulnerability was discovered during the resolution of customer support cases.
The illegal Input/Output operation and authentication sequence anomaly were discovered by Cisco during internal testing.
Status of this Notice: FINAL
============================
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors.
Distribution
============
This advisory is posted on Cisco's worldwide website at:
http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20080521-sce.shtml
In addition to worldwide web posting, a text version of this notice is clear-signed with the Cisco PSIRT PGP key and is posted to the following e-mail and Usenet news recipients.
* cust-security-announce@cisco.com
* first-teams@first.org
* bugtraq@securityfocus.com
* vulnwatch@vulnwatch.org
* cisco@spot.colorado.edu
* cisco-nsp@puck.nether.net
* full-disclosure@lists.grok.org.uk
* comp.dcom.sys.cisco@newsgate.cisco.com
Future updates of this advisory, if any, will be placed on Cisco's worldwide website, but may or may not be actively announced on mailing lists or newsgroups. Users concerned about this problem are encouraged to check the above URL for any updates.
Revision History
================
+------------------------------------------------------------+
| Revision 1.0 | 2008-May-21 | Initial public release. |
+------------------------------------------------------------+
Cisco Security Procedures
=========================
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html.
This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
Copyright 2007-2008 Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved.
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
Updated: May 21, 2008 Document ID: 100706
+--------------------------------------------------------------------
This advisory contains information released by the original author. Some of the information may have changed since it was released. If the issue affects you, it may be prudent to retrieve the advisory from the site of the original source to ensure that you receive the most current information concerning that problem. Reference to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favouring by CPNI.
The views and opinions of authors expressed within this notice shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. CPNI shall not accept responsibility for any errors or omissions contained within this advisory. In particular, they shall not be liable for any loss or damage whatsoever, arising from or in connection with the usage of information contained within this advisory.
CSIRTUK is a member of the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) and has contacts with other international Incident Response Teams (IRTs) in order to foster cooperation and coordination in incident prevention, to prompt rapid reaction to incidents, and to promote information sharing amongst its members and the community at large.
Thu, 22 May 2008 12:15:00 GMT
Domain affected: Technical