ID: 3708
Date: 06/11/2008
Title: 3708 - Cisco Security Response: Cisco VLAN Trunking Protocol Vulnerability
Platform level affected:Operating System
Specific operating systems components affected: Cisco IOS
Net-enabled software: Other
Remediation Summary:Update your copy of the software with the download available from the supplier.
Vendors affected:Cisco
Applications affected:VLAN Trunking Protocol
Adversity source: Unknown
Attack Vector: Vulnerability exploitation
Virulence: Unknown
Warning Status: Unknown
Potential Damage: Network DOS
Possible Duration: Unknown
Availability of fix: Available
Type of fix: Workaround
Source: Cisco
Reliability of source: Trusted
Source URL: http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sr-20081105-vtp.shtml
Abstract: Cisco's VTP protocol implementation in some versions of Cisco IOS and CatOS may be vulnerable to a DoS attack via a specially crafted VTP packet sent from the local network segment when operating in either server or client VTP mode.
Revision 1.0
For Public Release 2008 November 5 1600 UTC (GMT)
Cisco Response
==============
This is the Cisco response to research done by 'showrun.lee' pertaining to a crafted VTP packet denial of service vulnerability. We would like to thank 'showrun.lee' for reporting this vulnerability to us. We greatly appreciate the opportunity to work with researchers on security vulnerabilities, and welcome the opportunity to review and assist in security vulnerability reports against Cisco products.
This vulnerability is being addressed by Cisco Bug IDs:
* CSCsv05934 - Crafted VTP packet crashes device running IOS
* CSCsv11741 - Crafted VTP packet crashes switch running CatOS
Additional Information
======================
The VLAN Trunking Protocol (VTP) is a Layer 2 messaging protocol that maintains VLAN configuration consistency by managing the addition, deletion, and renaming of VLANs on a network-wide basis. When a network administrator makes any configuration changes to the VLAN setup on one device working as a VTP server, said configuration is then distributed via the VTP protocol through all switches in the domain. This reduces the need for replicating this VLAN configuration manually across switches. VTP is a Cisco-proprietary protocol that is available on most of the Cisco Catalyst series products using both Cisco IOS and Cisco CatOS system software.
Cisco's VTP protocol implementation in some versions of Cisco IOS and CatOS may be vulnerable to a DoS attack via a specially crafted VTP packet sent from the local network segment when operating in either server or client VTP mode. When the device receives the specially crafted VTP packet, the switch may crash (and reload/hang). The crafted packet must be received on a switch interface configured to operate as a trunk port.
Devices without a VTP domain name configured are still vulnerable.
For devices not requiring the use of VTP, administrators should set the VTP mode as "transparent" via the CLI command "vtp mode transparent". Devices configured with a VTP domain password are still vulnerable to exploitation, without the malicious attacker knowing the VTP domain password. Switch configuration best practices limit exposure to exploitation, by disabling the Dynamic Trunking Protocol
(DTP) on all switch ports that are not required to operate as trunk ports. See "Best Practices for Catalyst 6500/6000 Series and Catalyst 4500/4000 Series Switches Running Cisco IOS Software" and "Best Practices for Catalyst 4500/4000, 5500/5000, and 6500/6000 Series Switches Running CatOS Configuration and Management" for further information.
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/switches/ps700/products_white_paper09186a00801b49a4.shtml#cg4http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/switches/ps663/products_tech_note09186a0080094713.shtml#dtp
Products affected by this vulnerability:
* Devices running affected versions of Cisco IOS or CatOS that have
VTP Operating Mode as either "server" or "client".
* Devices running affected versions of Cisco IOS with Ethernet
Switch Modules for Cisco 1800/2600/2800/3600/3700/3800 Series
Routers that have VTP Operating Mode as either "server" or
"client".
Products not affected by these vulnerabilities:
* Devices configured with VTP operating mode as "transparent".
* Devices configured with VTP version 3 (CatOS only)
To determine the current VTP operating mode on a Cisco device, log into the device and issue the show vtp status command on an IOS device or the show vtp domain command on a CatOS device. Switches that show either "server" or "client" as the VTP operating mode are affected by this vulnerability.
The following example shows a device running Cisco IOS and operating in VTP "server" mode:
ios_switch#show vtp status
VTP Version : 2
Configuration Revision : 0
Maximum VLANs supported locally : 1005
Number of existing VLANs : 5
VTP Operating Mode : Server
VTP Domain Name : test
VTP Pruning Mode : Disabled
VTP V2 Mode : Enabled
VTP Traps Generation : Disabled
MD5 digest : <removed>
Configuration last modified by 0.0.0.0 at 3-1-93 04:02:09
ios_switch#
The following example shows a device running Cisco CatOS and operating in VTP "server" mode:
catos_switch> (enable) show vtp domain
Version : running VTP1 (VTP3 capable)
Domain Name : test Password : not configured
Notifications: disabled Updater ID: 0.0.0.0
Feature Mode Revision
-------------- -------------- -----------
VLAN Server 2
Pruning : disabled
VLANs prune eligible: 2-1000
catos_switch> (enable)
Status of this Notice: FINAL
============================
THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED ON AN "AS IS" BASIS AND DOES NOT IMPLY ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE OR WARRANTY, INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR USE. YOUR USE OF THE INFORMATION ON THE DOCUMENT OR MATERIALS LINKED FROM THE DOCUMENT IS AT YOUR OWN RISK. CISCO RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CHANGE OR UPDATE THIS DOCUMENT AT ANY TIME.
A stand-alone copy or Paraphrase of the text of this document that omits the distribution URL in the following section is an uncontrolled copy, and may lack important information or contain factual errors.
Revision History
================
+---------------------------------------+
| Revision | | Initial |
| 1.0 | 2008-November-5 | public |
| | | release |
+---------------------------------------+
Cisco Security Procedures
=========================
Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's worldwide website at:
http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/products_security_vulnerability_policy.html
This includes instructions for press inquiries regarding Cisco security notices. All Cisco security advisories are available at:
http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt
cust-security-announce mailing list
cust-security-announce@cisco.com
To unsubscribe, send the command "unsubscribe" in the subject of your message to cust-security-announce-leave@cisco.com
This advisory contains information released by the original author. Some of the information may have changed since it was released. If the issue affects you, it may be prudent to retrieve the advisory from the site of the original source to ensure that you receive the most current information concerning that problem. Reference to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favouring by CPNI.
The views and opinions of authors expressed within this notice shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. CPNI shall not accept responsibility for any errors or omissions contained within this advisory. In particular, they shall not be liable for any loss or damage whatsoever, arising from or in connection with the usage of information contained within this advisory.
CSIRTUK is a member of the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) and has contacts with other international Incident Response Teams (IRTs) in order to foster cooperation and coordination in incident prevention, to prompt rapid reaction to incidents, and to promote information sharing amongst its members and the community at large.
Thu, 06 Nov 2008 12:25:00 GMT
Domain affected: Technical