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Home > Products and services > CSIRTUK advisories > Advisories archive > July 2005 > MIT - Two Kerberos Security Advisories

July 2005

MIT - Two Kerberos Security Advisories

ID: 00572
Ref: 531/05
Date: 13 July 2005:13:13:38
Version: 1

Title: MIT - Two Kerberos Security Advisories
Abstract: 1. buffer overflow, heap corruption in KDC [MITKRB5-SA-2005-002], 2. double-free in krb5_recvauth [MITKRB5-SA-2005-003]
Vendors affected: multiple
Operating systems affected: multiple
Applications affected: multiple


Title
=====

MIT - Two Kerberos Security Advisories:
1. buffer overflow, heap corruption in KDC [MITKRB5-SA-2005-002]
2. double-free in krb5_recvauth [MITKRB5-SA-2005-003]


Detail
======

Security Advisory summaries:

1. An unauthenticated attacker may be able to use these vulnerabilities
to execute arbitrary code on the KDC host, potentially compromising an
entire Kerberos realm. No exploit code is known to exist at this
time. Exploitation of these vulnerabilities is believed to be
difficult.

2. The krb5_recvauth() function can free previously freed memory under
some error conditions. This vulnerability may allow an
unauthenticated remote attacker to execute arbitrary code.


Security Advisory content follows:

1.

- ------

MIT krb5 Security Advisory 2005-002

Original release: 2005-07-12

Topic: buffer overflow, heap corruption in KDC

Severity: CRITICAL

SUMMARY
=======

The MIT krb5 Key Distribution Center (KDC) implementation can corrupt
the heap by attempting to free memory at a random address when it
receives a certain unlikely (but valid) request via a TCP connection.
This attempt to free unallocated memory can result in a KDC crash and
consequent denial of service. [CAN-2005-1174, VU#259798]

Additionally, the same request, when received by the KDC via either
TCP or UDP, can trigger a bug in the krb5 library which results in a
single-byte overflow of a heap buffer. Application servers are
vulnerable to a highly improbable attack, provided that the attacker
controls a realm sharing a cross-realm key with the target
realm. [CAN-2005-1175, VU#885830]

An unauthenticated attacker may be able to use these vulnerabilities
to execute arbitrary code on the KDC host, potentially compromising an
entire Kerberos realm. No exploit code is known to exist at this
time. Exploitation of these vulnerabilities is believed to be
difficult.

IMPACT
======

An unauthenticated attacker may be able to execute arbitrary code on
the KDC host, potentially compromising an entire Kerberos realm. An
unsuccessful attack against the heap corruption vulnerability may
result in a denial of service by crashing the KDC process.

AFFECTED SOFTWARE
=================

* [CAN-2005-1174] affects the KDC implementation in all MIT krb5
releases supporting TCP client connections to the KDC. This
includes krb5-1.3 and later releases, up to and including
krb5-1.4.1.

* [CAN-2005-1175] affects KDC implementations and application servers
in all MIT krb5 releases, up to and including krb5-1.4.1.
Third-party application servers which use MIT krb5 are also
affected.

FIXES
=====

* The upcoming krb5-1.4.2 release will have fixes for these
vulnerabilities.

* WORKAROUNDS: Disabling TCP support in the KDC avoids one
vulnerability [CAN-2005-1174]. The single-byte overflow
[CAN-2005-1175] is still possible even without KDC TCP support
enabled. Running the KDC from init or from some similar automatic
respawning facility may reduce the durations of denials of service,
but this approach may make it difficult to detect deliberate attacks
targeted at code execution.

* Apply the patch at:

http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/advisories/2005-002-patch_1.4.1.txt

The associated detached PGP signature is at:

http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/advisories/2005-002-patch_1.4.1.txt.asc

The patch was generated against the krb5-1.4.1 release. It may
apply, with some offset, to earlier releases. On releases prior to
krb5-1.3, only the patch to lib/krb5/krb/unparse.c should be
necessary.

REFERENCES
==========

This announcement and related security advisories may be found on the
MIT Kerberos security advisory page at:

http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/advisories/index.html

The main MIT Kerberos web page is at:

http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/index.html

CVE: CAN-2005-1174
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-1174

CERT: VU#259798
http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/259798

CVE: CAN-2005-1175
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-1175

CERT: VU#885830
http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/885830

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
===============

Thanks to Daniel Wachdorf for reporting these vulnerabilities.

DETAILS
=======

Kerberos 5 principal names may have an arbitrary number of components.
The krb5_unparse_name() function in the MIT krb5 library converts an
internal representation of a Kerberos principal name into a
human-readable string. The internal representation might have
originated from the decoding of a Kerberos protocol message.

The single-byte overflow occurs whenever the krb5_unparse_name()
function is called on a principal name having zero components. The
function writes a null byte to an address one beyond the end of a
buffer allocated my malloc(). The corresponding krb5_parse_name()
function never generates an internal representation having zero
components; instead, it generates at least one zero-length component.
The current string representation form of Kerberos principal names has
some ambiguity between a zero-component principal name and a
one-component principal name having a zero-length single component.

Application servers which call krb5_unparse_name(), directly or
indirectly, are vulnerable to the single-byte overflow in
krb5_unparse_name(), provided that the attacker controls a realm which
shares a cross-realm key with the target realm. This enables the
attacker to use a cross-realm ticket for a zero-component client
principal name, which the application server will then pass to
krb5_unparse_name(), triggering the single-byte overflow.

For this attack to succeed, the attacker needs access to a KDC in the
target realm which will create a ticket for a zero-component client
principal name. Since the current MIT krb5 KDC implementation will
refuse to create such a ticket, the attack is unlikely to succeed
unless the implementation has been altered to allow the issuance of
tickets for zero-component client principal names.

When the KDC fails to find the principal with a zero-component name in
its database (such a principal is very unlikely to exist in most
databases, as there are extremely few uses for such a principal), it
attempts to encode an error packet containing the offending principal
name, using prepare_error_as() or prepare_error_tgs(). This encoding
attempt fails inside encode_krb5_error(), since the ASN.1 encoder
function asn1_encode_principal_name() interprets the internal
representation of a zero-component principal name as an error
condition.

encode_krb5_error() does not allocate an output buffer when it
encounters an error condition. While the UDP request handling code in
kdc/network.c:process_packet() does not attempt to free the output
buffer containing the encoded message when it encounters an error, the
TCP request handling code in process does free the buffer inside
kill_tcp_connection(), which attempts to free unallocated memory
pointed to by an uninitialized pointer.

REVISION HISTORY
================

2005-05-12 original release

Copyright (C) 2005 Massachusetts Institute of Technology

- ------




2.




- ------

MIT krb5 Security Advisory 2005-003

Original release: 2005-07-12

Topic: double-free in krb5_recvauth

Severity: CRITICAL

SUMMARY
=======

The krb5_recvauth() function can free previously freed memory under
some error conditions. This vulnerability may allow an
unauthenticated remote attacker to execute arbitrary code.
Exploitation of this vulnerability on a Kerberos Key Distribution
Center (KDC) host can result in compromise of an entire Kerberos
realm. No exploit code is known to exist at this time. Exploitation
of double-free vulnerabilities is believed to be difficult.
[CAN-2005-1689, VU#623332]

IMPACT
======

An unauthenticated attacker may be able to execute arbitrary code in
the context of a program calling krb5_recvauth(). This includes the
kpropd program which typically runs on slave Key Distribution Center
(KDC) hosts, potentially leading to compromise of an entire Kerberos
realm. Other vulnerable programs which call krb5_recvauth() are
usually remote login programs running with root privileges.
Unsuccessful attempts at exploitation may result in denial of service
by crashing the target program.

AFFECTED SOFTWARE
=================

* The kpropd daemon in all releases of MIT krb5, up to and including
krb5-1.4.1, is vulnerable.

* The klogind and krshd remote-login daemons in all releases of MIT
krb5, up to and including krb5-1.4.1, is vulnerable.

* Third-party application programs which call krb5-recvauth() are also
vulnerable.

FIXES
=====

* The upcoming krb5-1.4.2 release will have a fix for this
vulnerability.

* Apply the following patch. This patch was generated against the
krb5-1.4.1 release. It may apply, with some offset, to earlier
releases.

The patch may also be found at:

http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/advisories/2005-003-patch_1.4.1.txt

The associated detached PGP signature is at:

http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/advisories/2005-003-patch_1.4.1.txt.asc

Index: lib/krb5/krb/recvauth.c
===================================================================
RCS file: /cvs/krbdev/krb5/src/lib/krb5/krb/recvauth.c,v
retrieving revision 5.38
diff -c -r5.38 recvauth.c
*** lib/krb5/krb/recvauth.c 3 Sep 2002 01:13:47 -0000 5.38
- --- lib/krb5/krb/recvauth.c 23 May 2005 23:19:15 -0000
***************
*** 76,82 ****
if ((retval = krb5_read_message(context, fd, &inbuf)))
return(retval);
if (strcmp(inbuf.data, sendauth_version)) {
- - krb5_xfree(inbuf.data);
problem = KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAUTHVERS;
}
krb5_xfree(inbuf.data);
- --- 76,81 ----
***************
*** 90,96 ****
if ((retval = krb5_read_message(context, fd, &inbuf)))
return(retval);
if (appl_version && strcmp(inbuf.data, appl_version)) {
- - krb5_xfree(inbuf.data);
if (!problem)
problem = KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAPPLVERS;
}
- --- 89,94 ----

REFERENCES
==========

This announcement and related security advisories may be found on the
MIT Kerberos security advisory page at:

http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/advisories/index.html

The main MIT Kerberos web page is at:

http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/index.html

CVE: CAN-2005-1689
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2005-1689

CERT: VU#623332
http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/623332

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
===============

Thanks to Magnus Hagander for reporting this vulnerability.

DETAILS
=======

The helper function revcauth_common() in lib/krb5/krb/recvauth.c has
two locations which call krb5_read_message(), followed by an
unconditional krb5_xfree() of the buffer allocated by
krb5_read_message(). In the cases where the sendauth version string
or the application version string do not match the expected value,
recvauth_common() performs a krb5_xfree() on the buffer allocated by
krb5_read_message() preceding the subsequent unconditional call to
krb5_xfree() on the same buffer.

Since the code paths which call krb5_xfree() twice do so with almost
no intervening code, exploitation of this vulnerability may be more
difficult than exploitation of other double-free vulnerabilities. No
detailed analysis has been performed on the ease of exploitation.

REVISION HISTORY
================

2005-05-12 original release

Copyright (C) 2005 Massachusetts Institute of Technology

- ------



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