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Home > Products and services > CSIRTUK advisories > Advisories archive > January 2006 > Two Gentoo Linux Security Advisories: 1. GLSA 200601-14 - LibAST: Privilege escalation 2. GLSA 200601-15 - Paros: Default administrator password

January 2006

Two Gentoo Linux Security Advisories: 1. GLSA 200601-14 - LibAST: Privilege escalation 2. GLSA 200601-15 - Paros: Default administrator password

ID: 00096
Ref: 95/2006
Date: 30 January 2006:14:19:07
Version: 1

Title: Two Gentoo Linux Security Advisories: 1. GLSA 200601-14 - LibAST: Privilege escalation 2. GLSA 200601-15 - Paros: Default administrator password
Abstract:
Vendors affected: Gentoo
Operating systems affected: Gentoo
Applications affected: Gentoo

Title
=====

Two Gentoo Linux Security Advisories:

1. GLSA 200601-14 - LibAST: Privilege escalation

2. GLSA 200601-15 - Paros: Default administrator password

Detail
======

1. Michael Jennings discovered an exploitable buffer overflow in the
configuration engine of LibAST.

2. Andrew Christensen discovered that in older versions of Paros the
database component HSQLDB is installed with an empty password for the
database administrator "sa".



1.



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Gentoo Linux Security Advisory GLSA 200601-14
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http://security.gentoo.org/
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Severity: High
Title: LibAST: Privilege escalation
Date: January 29, 2006
Bugs: #120106
ID: 200601-14

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Synopsis
========

A buffer overflow in LibAST may result in execution of arbitrary code
with escalated privileges.

Background
==========

LibAST is a utility library that was originally intended to accompany
Eterm, but may be used by various other applications.

Affected packages
=================

-------------------------------------------------------------------
Package / Vulnerable / Unaffected
-------------------------------------------------------------------
1 x11-libs/libast < 0.7 >= 0.7

Description
===========

Michael Jennings discovered an exploitable buffer overflow in the
configuration engine of LibAST.

Impact
======

The vulnerability can be exploited to gain escalated privileges if the
application using LibAST is setuid/setgid and passes a specifically
crafted filename to LibAST's configuration engine.

Workaround
==========

Identify all applications linking against LibAST and verify they are
not setuid/setgid.

Resolution
==========

All users should upgrade to the latest version and run revdep-rebuild:

# emerge --sync
# emerge --ask --oneshot --verbose >=x11-libs/libast-0.7
# revdep-rebuild

References
==========

[ 1 ] CVE-2006-0224
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-0224

Availability
============

This GLSA and any updates to it are available for viewing at
the Gentoo Security Website:

http://security.gentoo.org/glsa/glsa-200601-14.xml

Concerns?
=========

Security is a primary focus of Gentoo Linux and ensuring the
confidentiality and security of our users machines is of utmost
importance to us. Any security concerns should be addressed to
security@gentoo.org or alternatively, you may file a bug at
http://bugs.gentoo.org.

License
=======

Copyright 2006 Gentoo Foundation, Inc; referenced text
belongs to its owner(s).

The contents of this document are licensed under the
Creative Commons - Attribution / Share Alike license.

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0


2.

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Gentoo Linux Security Advisory GLSA 200601-15
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http://security.gentoo.org/
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Severity: High
Title: Paros: Default administrator password
Date: January 29, 2006
Bugs: #120352
ID: 200601-15

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Synopsis
========

Paros's database component is installed without a password, allowing
execution of arbitrary system commands.

Background
==========

Paros is an intercepting proxy between a web server and a client meant
to be used for security assessments. It allows the user to watch and
modify the HTTP(S) traffic.

Affected packages
=================

-------------------------------------------------------------------
Package / Vulnerable / Unaffected
-------------------------------------------------------------------
1 net-proxy/paros <= 3.2.5 > 3.2.5

Description
===========

Andrew Christensen discovered that in older versions of Paros the
database component HSQLDB is installed with an empty password for the
database administrator "sa".

Impact
======

Since the database listens globally by default, an attacker can connect
and issue arbitrary commands, including execution of binaries installed
on the host.

Workaround
==========

There is no known workaround at this time.

Resolution
==========

All Paros users should upgrade to the latest version:

# emerge --snyc
# emerge --ask --oneshot --verbose ">=net-proxy/paros-3.2.8"

References
==========

[ 1 ] CVE-2005-3280
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2005-3280

Availability
============

This GLSA and any updates to it are available for viewing at
the Gentoo Security Website:

http://security.gentoo.org/glsa/glsa-200601-15.xml

Concerns?
=========

Security is a primary focus of Gentoo Linux and ensuring the
confidentiality and security of our users machines is of utmost
importance to us. Any security concerns should be addressed to
security@gentoo.org or alternatively, you may file a bug at
http://bugs.gentoo.org.

License
=======

Copyright 2006 Gentoo Foundation, Inc; referenced text
belongs to its owner(s).

The contents of this document are licensed under the
Creative Commons - Attribution / Share Alike license.

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0
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