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Centre for the Protection  
of National Infrastructure



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# Cyber Assurance of Physical Security Systems (CAPSS) – 2021

**SECURITY CHARACTERISTIC**

Updated v1.1

**CPNI**

Centre for the Protection  
of National Infrastructure



National Cyber  
Security Centre

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**Document history**

CPNI may review, amend, update, replace or issue new CAPSS documents as may be required from time to time. There will be a regular review period to ensure that the requirements remain up-to-date. The CAPSS scheme is revised from time to time, creating new versions of each of the documents that define the scheme. Different versions of the CAPSS scheme as a whole are denoted by the year – hence for example “CAPSS 2019” or “CAPSS 2021” – version numbers of individual documents are issued within a version of the scheme hence both CAPSS 2019 and CAPSS 2021 have their own version 1.0 of the Security Characteristic.

Version	Date	Description
1.1	18 June 2021	Updated release
1.0	15 Jan 2021	First Release

**Any comments or suggestions regarding this document should be directed to: [cse@cpni.gov.uk](mailto:cse@cpni.gov.uk)**

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# Executive Summary

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**This document describes the features, testing and deployment requirements necessary to meet CPNI CAPSS certification for physical security systems. It is intended for vendors, system architects, developers, evaluation and technical staff operating within the security arena.**

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This document is the Security Characteristic for the Cyber Assurance of Physical Security Systems (CAPSS) – it describes minimum baseline requirements for physical security systems for evaluation and certification under CPNI's Cyber Assurance of Physical Security Systems (CAPSS) standard for inclusion in the Catalogue of Security Equipment (CSE) published by CPNI. Where there is already a CSE chapter, a product developer should also confirm that the product meets any functional requirements for that category in the CSE. Although it is possible to carry out a CAPSS evaluation before addressing CSE functional requirements, if the CSE requirements lead to product architecture and design changes then this may require CAPSS re-evaluation activities. Where there is no CSE chapter, the product only needs to be CAPSS evaluated.

- **Section 1 is suitable for all readers. It outlines the purpose of the security product and defines the scope of the Security Characteristic.**
- **Section 2 and Section 3 describe the specific mitigations required to prevent or hinder attacks against physical security systems. Some technical knowledge is assumed.**

CAPSS evaluation is not a guarantee of freedom from security vulnerabilities. There remains a probability that exploitable security vulnerabilities may exist in the product or the information systems environment supporting the product. However, the purpose of CAPSS evaluation of products is to raise the bar of these products when they will be deployed in critical locations.

# Section 1 – Overview

## 1.1 Overview

This document is the Security Characteristic for the Cyber Assurance of Physical Security Systems (CAPSS) – it describes minimum baseline requirements for physical security systems for evaluation and certification under CPNI’s CAPSS standard for inclusion in the Catalogue of Security Equipment (CSE) published by CPNI. Where there is already a CSE chapter, a product developer should also confirm that the product meets any functional requirements for that category in the CSE. Although it is possible to carry out a CAPSS evaluation before addressing CSE functional requirements, if the CSE requirements lead to product architecture and design changes then this may require CAPSS re-evaluation activities<sup>1</sup>. Where there is no CSE chapter, the product only needs to be CAPSS evaluated.

CAPSS evaluation is not a guarantee of freedom from security vulnerabilities. There remains a probability that exploitable security vulnerabilities may exist in the product or the Information Systems environment supporting the product. However, the purpose of CAPSS evaluation of products is to raise the bar of these products when they will be deployed in critical locations.

## 1.2 System description

The physical security systems covered by this document, are those that provide physical security measures while using IT systems and communicating over IP networks. These include Automatic Access Control Systems, Visitor Management Systems, Closed Circuit Television, Intrusion Detection Systems, and Physical Security Information Management Systems. Each of these may employ distinct network services and protocols, distinct client and server elements, and a variety of sensors or other interface devices. Some elements will be deployed in a secure area while others will be deployed in public or non-secure areas. Some will be automatic while others will be attended or monitored by staff.

Although there is a wide variety of systems that are addressed by this document, the requirements contained in the mitigations are intended to be applicable, where appropriate to the implementation technologies used, to all systems. Thus, the mitigations are not defined in terms that are specific to a particular solution or technology, but in terms that can be applied by evaluators in the context of the specific system under evaluation.

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<sup>1</sup> In general, re-evaluation is likely to be required when the attack surface of the product changes (e.g. by adding interfaces or changing the content or form of those interfaces). Further information on changes requiring re-evaluation is available from CPNI. It remains the developer’s responsibility to ensure that changes to the product do not require re-evaluation, and it is noted that the periodic reviews of CAPSS-approved products (as indicated in the CAPSS lifecycle) will examine product changes since the last evaluation to confirm that re-evaluation has been carried out where required.

### 1.3 Exclusions

Products that do not use IP networks.

### 1.4 Typical use case(s)

The products will be used to provide physical security for buildings within the Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) estate, although the products may be used for non-CNI related areas as well.

### 1.5 Expected operating environment

In most cases, a Physical Security System will consist of a number of different products addressing various aspects of a protection objective, where each product may have been provided by one or more suppliers from one or more manufacturers. Figure 1 below illustrates the types of element that are likely to be included in such a system. Some elements will necessarily be deployed in exterior, public or otherwise non-secure areas, and will generally be unattended once deployed. Other elements such as controllers and management systems must be deployed in one or more secure areas. Some must be deployed in a secure enclave (such as a secured server room or a control room – see Appendix B Glossary). External services may be required, including provision of network connectivity, reliable time services, or for sending alarms to other organisations such as emergency services. Typically, subsets of products will be installed as a subsystem consisting of elements in both secure and non-secure areas, requiring communications between them. Such subsystems may operate independently or integrated with other subsystems.

Figure 2 shows a typical implementation, where a command & control subsystem implements the integrated management, logging and admin functions; an AACS subsystem is an example of a controller with a deployment of interactive devices to permit access for authorised users; a CCTV subsystem is used for monitoring; a physical intrusion detection system deploys movement and infra-red sensors; a perimeter monitoring system deploys exterior sensors; and a Visitor Management System manages access by visitors with a reception workstation.




Figure 1 – Elements of a Physical Security System




Figure 2 - Typical implementation



## 1.6 Interoperability

In order that products from one manufacturer will operate correctly with products from another manufacturer where they are required to communicate, it is expected that open, published, industry standards will be used by default. The Tailored Security Characteristic (see Section 1.7 below) shall identify the minimum version number of each component<sup>2</sup> of the Physical Security System under evaluation and the versions of any protocols that it uses.

## 1.7 How to use this security characteristic

Because this Security Characteristic is based around a generic model and generic requirements, the evaluator first produces a Tailored Security Characteristic (TSC) that defines the requirements specific to the particular product being evaluated. The concept of a Tailored Security Characteristic is described in [PPFGE, III E], however in this case the main activity is to identify the SC mitigations that apply to each of the elements that make up the product. Terminology mappings as described in [PPFGE, para 36] may also be included if required. The evaluator is reminded that, as stated in [PPFGE, para 38], it is vital that the TSC always covers all of the requirements from the Security Characteristic and that if any additions are made then they do not undermine or weaken these original requirements. In the case of a Physical Security System product, because there is a significant benefit to potential end-users from understanding what mitigations have been applied, and to which elements of the product, it is expected that the TSC will be published as a separate document, and will **not** be part of an Assurance Plan – cf. [PPFGE, para 41].

To ensure a consistent approach to the evaluation of multi-device products, it is recommended that for such a product the multiple devices are all included in a single TSC, with separate sections for the mitigations applicable to each device, and marking different iterations of the same requirements using a label such as 'DEV.105/<device name>'.

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<sup>2</sup> Versions are required for each component that is separately identifiable to customers: the intention is that customers can relate the component version identifiers to any reported vulnerabilities in the component, and to the versions tested in evaluations and assurance maintenance activities.

## 1.8 High level functional components




Figure 1 - Functional components of a physical security system

Figure 1 above shows the functional components of a physical security system. The applicability of some of these functional components (such as *Cloud Services*) to a particular Physical Security System product is determined by the architecture and communications between elements. Some functional component mitigations may not be required for specific product variants, as indicated in Appendix D. When evaluating a product, the evaluation team must determine the applicability of the mitigations for each component and document this in the Tailored Security Characteristic as described in Section 1.7. Note that cryptographic functions are not identified as a separate functional component, but are addressed where applicable within the mitigations relating to other functional components.

The functional components are:

- **Physical security** – this includes access to physical ports, removable media, debug interfaces, tamper-protection boundary and resistance to attacks such as loss of power.
- **Secure configuration** – the product must follow NCSC End User Device Guidance [EUD] where applicable, with controls over who can change configurations.
- **Network security** – the product will consist of elements that need to communicate with each other or to other systems. There must be controls on the other devices with which the product can communicate protection for data in transit on communication channels outside the secure enclave, and an ability to limit the impact of a DoS attack from network interfaces.
- **Authentication management (Privileges)** – use of MFA and a suitable password policy, with unique credentials for each individual user, with privileges based on roles. Software installations and updates must be verified before being applied.
- **Monitoring** – the product must include resilient logging of significant security-related events.

- **Cloud services (External)** – if the product uses external cloud services, they must meet the NCSC Cloud Security Principles [Cloud].

## 1.9 Pre-requisites

1. In addition to meeting the requirements of this Security Characteristic, the developers of a product must demonstrate that their development approach complies with the engineering principles and practices that are expected from a product developer creating a good quality, secure product. Validation of the Product Developer against the NCSC Build Standard [BS] is required, to provide confidence of a secure and well-understood product throughout the product's lifecycle. It covers both development processes and the general security approach taken by the Product Developer. While the Security Characteristic addresses building the right features into the product, the Build Standard addresses building the product in the right way. Adherence with the Build Standard alone will not result in a secure product. However, the absence of key elements of the Build Standard makes assurance impracticable. A successful Build Standard validation for a developer is required to provide on-going assurance that subsequent versions of a product will continue to meet requirements.
2. Alongside the Build Standard, the evaluators will expect to see evidence that the developer has a management system that encompasses information security. This can be demonstrated by [ISO9001] certification, and either [ISO27001] certification or Cyber Essentials PLUS [CEPlus] certification (or both).
3. The developers must have a publicly stated vulnerability disclosure policy consistent with the recommendations in [ISO29147], and should have vulnerability handling processes consistent with [ISO30111].
4. The developers must have a publicly stated end-of-life / support lifetime policy for the product.
5. Note that use of cloud services or wireless communications may be subject to additional deployment restrictions outside the scope of this SC.

## 1.10 Additional information

This document has been produced by CPNI with input from, and review by, NCSC.

## 1.11 Information on future changes

With regard to DEV.402: [IEEE802.1X] may be required over MAC filtering in future.

With regard to VER.407: it is preferred that developers undertake their own fuzz testing as part of one or more stages in the product development lifecycle. Fuzz testing by the developer may become a mandatory requirement in future.

# Section 2 – Security

## Characteristic Format

### 2.1 Security Characteristic Format

This CPNI Security Characteristic contains a list of mitigations that describe the specific measures required to prevent or hinder attacks. The mitigations are grouped into three requirement categories: development, verification and deployment. They appear in Section 3 of this document in that order.

- **Development mitigations** (indicated by the **DEV** prefix) are measures integrated into the development of the product during its design and implementation. Development mitigations are checked by an evaluation team during a CAPSS evaluation.
- **Verification mitigations** (indicated by the **VER** prefix) are specific measures that an evaluator must test (or observe) during a CAPSS evaluation.
- **Deployment mitigations** (indicated by the **DEP** prefix) are specific measures that describe the deployment and operational control of the product. These are used by system administrators and users to ensure the product is securely deployed and used in practice. As part of the CAPSS evaluation, the evaluation team must check that the deployment mitigations are included in the product's deployment manual.

Within each of the above categories, the mitigations are further grouped into the functional areas to which they relate (as outlined in the High level functional components diagram). The functional area for a designated group of mitigations is prefixed by double chevron characters ('>>').

For example, mitigations within a section that begins:

[Development >> Network Security](#)

concern **Development** mitigations relating to the **Network Security** functional area of the product.

## 2.2 Understanding mitigations

Each of the mitigations listed in Section 3 of this document contain the following elements:

- The name of the mitigation. This will include a mitigation prefix (**DEV**, **VER** or **DEP**) and a unique reference number.
- A description of the threat (or threats) that the mitigation is designed to prevent or hinder. Threats are formatted in *italic text*.
- The explicit requirement (or group of requirements) that *must* be carried out. Requirements are formatted in **green text**.

In addition, certain mitigations may also contain additional explanatory text to clarify specific details of the mandatory requirements. This is illustrated in the following diagram.




Figure 2: Components of a typical mitigation

# Section 3 – Mitigations

## 3.1 Development mitigations

### 3.1.1 Development >> General

#### **DEV.100: Evaluation/Cryptocheck**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of a cryptographic algorithm implementation error*

The product **is required to** use only cryptographic algorithms that have been validated as per the 'Cryptography Review' section in the NCSC CPA Process for Performing Foundation Grade Evaluations document [PPFGE], for any security functionality covered by this SC.

The developer shall provide a rationale for the cryptographic algorithms used in the product, and evidence that they have been independently validated for correctness under CAVP (or equivalent external certification).

This must include all cryptographic algorithms used in communications protocols.

#### **DEV.101: Heap hardening**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of a software implementation/logic error*

The product **is required to** use the heap memory management provided by the operating system. Products must not implement their own heap.

Products are not required to use a heap, but if they do, they must not implement their own.

**DEV.102: Stack protection**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of a software implementation/logic error*

The product is **required to be compiled with support for stack protection including all libraries, where the tool chain supports it.**

If more recent versions of the tool chain support stack protection for the target platform then they should be used in preference to a legacy tool chain.

If the tool chain does not provide stack protection support, the developers are expected to implement robust measures that offer equivalent protection, ensuring that they are not optimised out by the compiler. The following features are expected as a minimum:

- Detect corruption of a function return address before the function returns to that address, such as by using a shadow stack. The corrupted return address will not be used, and appropriate remediation action will be performed instead, such as rebooting the product into a good known state.
- Be present in functions that have one or more arrays declared in the function's stack frame (this includes third party library code within the same runtime environment as the application code).
- If canaries are used to detect corruption, then:
  - The size of the canaries must be at least that of a memory pointer for the device's platform (e.g. canary size would need to be at least 32 bits for a 32-bit architecture)
  - The values used for the canaries must vary across different devices in a non-predictable manner (thus any exploit based on a known canary value in one device cannot be used to compromise lots of other devices).
  - Additionally, the canary value should also change in a specific device each time the product (re)boots, though this is not mandatory.

**DEV.103: Data Execution Prevention**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of a software implementation/logic error*

The product is **required to support Data Execution Prevention when enabled on its hosting platform and must not opt out of Data Execution Prevention.**

If the product is to be exclusively deployed on a platform that does not support either software Data Execution Prevention or hardware-enforced Data Execution Prevention, or equivalent, there is no requirement for Data Execution Prevention compatibility.

**DEV.104: Address Space Layout Randomisation**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of a software implementation/logic error*

The product is **required to be compiled with full support for ASLR, including all libraries used.**

If the product is to be exclusively deployed on an operating system that does not support ASLR, there is no requirement for ASLR compatibility. Note: ASLR may be disabled for specific aspects of the product, provided there is a valid justification of why this is required (such as a single process device with no underlying operating system, or deployment on a FPGA/ASIC device).

**DEV.105: Encrypt sensitive data**

*This mitigation is required to counter extraction of sensitive data held on the device*

The product is required to store sensitive data using encrypted data protection functions of the host platform.

Sensitive data includes personal data and configuration data. This ensures that, if a device is stolen, the sensitive data will be protected (such as the protection afforded by BitLocker or equivalents). Refer to [EUD] for specific guidance for end-user devices. The product design information must identify sensitive data types that it processes and stores, and the measures taken to protect each type.

Sensitive data must be encrypted using hardware-backed encryption where available (e.g. TPM or Trusted Execution Environment), otherwise using software encryption. As well as being encrypted, measures must include integrity protection.

In general, sensitive data should not be stored on devices that are exposed outside of the secure enclave.

Encryption of stored data must use AES in one of the following modes: AES-CBC with 128/256 bit key, or AES-CCM with 128/256 bit key, or AES-GCM with 128/256 bit key, or AES-XTS with 256/512 bit key.

**DEV.106: Updateable product**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of a known or discovered software implementation/logic error*

The product is required to support the use of software updates.

In exceptional cases, such as a Low Functioning device (see Appendix B Glossary), updates may not be feasible. In such cases a suitable rationale must be provided to enable the evaluators to determine whether the lack of updates is justified.

**DEV.107: Secure software delivery**

*This mitigation is required to counter installing compromised software*

The product and its updates are required to be distributed via a cryptographically protected mechanism, such that the authenticity of software can be ensured.

While some simple devices, such as sensors, may be supplied with pre-installed software, most products will include software which is installed prior to deployment and capable of being subsequently updated. Software for the initial installation and also for subsequent updates must be delivered by a secure mechanism to ensure that its authenticity can be assured. The software must be signed in such a way that it can be verified before installation or before an update is applied.

In exceptional cases, such as a Low Functioning device, software installation may not be feasible. In such cases a suitable rationale must be provided to enable the evaluators to determine whether the lack of secure software delivery is justified.



**DEV.108: Protected software environment**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of a software implementation/logic error*

The product is required to implement software protection measures as part of the design process.

The product design information shall describe the process environment in the product in order to allow the evaluator to identify any defensive or robustness mechanisms provided by the platform or OS, including exception handling, memory management and sandboxing functionality where available.

The developer shall provide static analysis evidence to demonstrate product firmware compliance with MISRA 2012 rules for C (or equivalent for the target language); or evidence from the lint-like tool available for the toolchain or language in use.

The developer shall demonstrate that they review all device firmware against a checklist of security flaws, including known vulnerabilities, in other versions of the product or its components (e.g. where 3rd party software/hardware is used), and known vulnerabilities in similar devices. Note: Aspects of this requirement should be covered by the developer's on-going Build Standard compliance obligations.

**DEV.109: Unique security data per device**

*This mitigation is required to counter gaining access to security data in a single device*

The product is required to contain no security data that enables compromise of a different device.

Devices shall not contain data which if compromised would directly enable an attacker to compromise another device (such as shared keys that would enable the attacker to masquerade as a different device).

### 3.1.2 Development >> Physical Security

#### DEV.200: Disable non-operational logical and physical interfaces

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of insecure internal or external interfaces*

The product is required to prevent unauthorised access to all physical and logical interfaces that are not required for normal operation.

Normal operation is day to day operation after installation and configuration. For some devices this may need to include regular maintenance activities.

If the device has interfaces other than those supporting normal operation (e.g. installation or engineering interfaces or menus etc.) then design information shall explain how these interfaces are either:

- a) disabled for normal operation, or
- b) cannot be used to undermine device security – developer provided rationale required.

Debug interfaces (such as JTAG, SWD, UARTs, or I2C) must be disabled in normal operation; if re-enablement is possible then it must require multi-factor authentication by the manufacturer or installer/integrator using (in either case) credentials that are unique per device, or else must require a breach of the tamper boundary resulting in a visible physical change, and an alert sent on (or before) use of the interface. If the device is intended to be deployed in a non-secure area, then disablement may be achieved by the use of epoxy potting over debug interfaces to prevent their use, or stronger methods.

Physical interfaces include external interfaces for removable media (such as USB, thunderbolt or lightning) as well as internal removable media (such as an internal SD card or SIM).

Device design information shall specify any roles and associated interfaces that are supported in any stage of the device lifecycle (e.g. before installation or after decommissioning). The device design information shall include a complete definition of the logical and physical interfaces (such that the information could be used to create a test tool that will exercise all parts of the interface, with an ability to define expected results for any communication).

#### DEV.201: Tamper response

*This mitigation is required to counter access to structures inside the tamper-protection boundary of the device*

The product is required to cause an alert and log entry on breach of the tamper-protection boundary.

Removing or opening any part of the tamper-protection boundary that is designed to be separately removed or opened shall be detectable and cause the product to cause an alert and a log entry. The alert may be indicated by various means such as an alarm or flashing indicator or an alert raised at a connected controller when the connection is lost.

Attempts to tamper with a device that is not designed to be opened should be detectable and result in an alert and log entry.

End user devices that are protected by appropriate measures specified in [EUD] guidance (and servers or other high functioning devices implementing equivalent measures) to encrypt local data, such as Bitlocker, are not required to generate a tamper alert but their disconnection from a controller must be alerted by the controller.

**DEV.202: Fail secure on power loss**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation by removing power*

The product is required to remain secure in the event of power loss.

In the event of a loss of power the device must not fail in a way that undermines the security requirements.

When power is restored, the device must restart in a state that does not undermine the security requirements.

**DEV.203: Protection of security-related physical structure**

*This mitigation is required to counter unauthorised physical access to security-critical data stored on the device*

The product is required to ensure that physical access to processors and memory carrying sensitive data requires breach of the tamper-protection boundary.

Device design information shall identify the 'tamper-protection boundary' that is protected against tampering, and the methods and mechanisms used to provide this protection. This boundary shall be clearly defined with respect to the physical boundary of the device, and with respect to the components that generate, process and store sensitive data (including cryptographic keys), and that carry out cryptographic operations.

Device design information shall specify the physical ports and logical interfaces and all defined input and output paths that are available across the tamper-protection boundary.

Device design information shall specify all cryptographic keys employed by the device (including any that are not required for normal operation) and their storage locations, such that these can be identified as being inside the tamper-protection boundary.

End user devices and servers that are protected by appropriate measures specified in [EUD] guidance (and servers or other high functioning devices implementing equivalent measures) to encrypt local data, such as Bitlocker, are not required to have a tamper-protection boundary.

### 3.1.3 Development >> Secure Configuration

**DEV.300: Provide a configuration tool to enforce required settings**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of an accidental misconfiguration*

The product **is required to** be provided with a configuration tool, or other method, for an administrator to initially set it up into a suitable configuration.

If a software product requires more than 12 options to be changed or set by an administrator to comply with these Security Characteristics, the developer must supply a tool, policy template, or specific configuration guide which helps the administrator to achieve this in fewer steps.

**DEV.301: Ensure product security configuration can only be altered by an authenticated system administrator**

*This mitigation is required to counter unauthorised alteration of product's configuration*

The product **is required to** ensure that only authenticated administrators are able to change the product's security enforcing settings.

This includes configuration of any key and certificate management required in support of authentication or other cryptographic functionality of the product.

**DEV.302: Ensure product security configuration can be backed up**

*This mitigation is required to counter unauthorised alteration of product's configuration*

The product **is required to** ensure that the product's security enforcing settings can be securely backed up.

In the event of a failure, the security configuration must be able to be restored in a timely fashion by an appropriately authorised administrator.

**DEV.303: Deploy onto suitably protected endpoint**

*This mitigation is required to counter malware on endpoint*

The product **is required to** ensure that endpoints are configured in line with good IT practice as part of a risk-managed accredited system.

If the endpoint device is provided with the product, the developer must provide assurances that the relevant NCSC [EUD] Guidance for the platform has been met or, if such guidance is not available, then provide a rationale that they implement best practice for the platform.

### 3.1.4 Development >> Network Security

**DEV.400: Minimise interfaces**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of a non-operational interface through crafted input*

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of an operational interface through crafted input*

The product **is required to ensure that only necessary protocols and services are available on the device.**

Network ports and services shall only be opened if required for the device to function. If there is any additional functionality provided in the device beyond that required for normal operation, the developers must provide documentation and a rationale to demonstrate that it does not impact the security requirements in this Security Characteristic.

**DEV.401: Wireless network must be secured**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of unsecured wireless network*

The product **is required to ensure that wireless networks are secured.**

If the product uses wireless technologies it must enforce the use of suitable security mechanisms to protect the communications channels. WiFi connections using WPA2 Enterprise as a minimum are preferred. Where the use of Bluetooth or other wireless networking protocols is unavoidable, the product must enforce the use of secure protocols at higher levels in the communications stack to provide encryption and authentication protection such as TLS, employing NIST approved cryptographic algorithms.

(Note also DEP.408, which requires that wireless networks are not used on any site requiring more than a basic level of protection.)

**DEV.402: Use whitelist to limit communications**

*This mitigation is required to counter messages from unauthorised devices*

The product **should check that messages are from a device on a whitelist.**

The product should use a whitelist feature to ensure that communications are from devices that have been previously authorised. Although this can be as straightforward as MAC filtering, [IEEE802.1X] is preferred.

**DEV.403: Use time synchronisation**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of variations in time between devices*

The product **is required to use time synchronisation to ensure all devices have a reference time source.**

The time synchronisation can be obtained from an external time server or an internal time server with a trusted time source, using a suitable protocol such as NTP or PTP. This must only use a major version that is still supported, for which all up to date security patches have been applied.

**DEV.404: Use segregated networks**

*This mitigation is required to counter an attack through a connected network*

The product is required to use segregated networks.

If the product is supplied with network setup, this must use VLANs or other network segregation approaches to separate unrelated components. As a minimum, any management interface must be on a separate VLAN.

**DEV.405: General resource management**

*This mitigation is required to counter a DoS attack from a network interface*

The product is required to protect against instability when processing incoming network traffic.

The developer shall provide a rationale to show that large amounts of incoming network traffic do not cause the device to crash or suffer a general failure resulting in loss of functionality (apart from temporarily losing external communications).

**DEV.406: Encrypt communications traffic over untrusted link**

*This mitigation is required to counter interception of data from unencrypted links*

The product is required to use approved cryptographic algorithms to protect communications traffic on untrusted links.

Any communications link that is partially or entirely outside the secure enclave must be regarded as untrusted.

Data must be protected in transit. Non-sensitive data needs to be provided with integrity protection at minimum. Sensitive data must be encrypted and integrity protected. The cryptographic algorithms and cipher suites used must be NIST approved.

Guidance on suitable means to protect data in transit can be found at [[TLS NCSC](#)] and [[IPsec NCSC](#)].

### 3.1.5 Development >> Authentication Management (Privileges)

**DEV.500: Role based access control**

*This mitigation is required to counter privilege escalation on management application*

*This mitigation is required to counter unauthorised use of management privilege*

The product is required to allow users to be assigned to specific roles.

Users must be able to be assigned to specific roles, with the roles determining what operations may be performed, ensuring that users are only able to perform operations and access data appropriate to their role.

If the definition of user roles is customisable, this must only be able to be performed by an admin user with an appropriate privilege.

**DEV.501: User least privilege**

*This mitigation is required to counter taking advantage of existing user privilege*

The product is required to operate correctly from a standard account with the minimum privileges required for the user's role.

For a non-admin role, the product must operate correctly from a standard account without elevated privileges. For an admin role, or other role that requires some elevated privileges, the developer must provide a rationale identifying and justifying the use of such privileges. Privileges include both OS and product-defined privileges.

**DEV.502: User authentication**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of weak user passwords*

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of unattended workstations*

The product is required to enforce a password policy defined by an administrator, or a MFA authentication mechanism that is unique to each user.

If users are not required to use a MFA authentication mechanism that is unique to each user, there must be a password policy that, as a minimum, meets the requirements defined in Appendix C of this document.

The developer shall identify all passwords for which default values are defined in the product.

The product is required to lock out a session after a defined period of inactivity, requiring the user to re-authenticate.

Inactivity period may be configurable but must be no longer than 15 minutes for admin roles and any roles used outside the secure area; but may be up to 120 minutes for roles that are used in a secure area for passive review of data (such as CCTV).

**DEV.504: Local management authentication**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of poorly protected management interfaces*

The product is required to use a MFA authentication mechanism that is unique to each user for admin users.

Admin accounts must use MFA authentication.

**DEV.505: Remote management authentication**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of poorly protected management interfaces*

The product **is required to** authenticate any remote management interface using a secure protocol, such as IPsec, SNMPv3, TLS or SSH with MFA authentication.

Remote management access must be protected by a secure protocol and MFA authentication.

Remote access must be disabled by default, and require specific action during installation (or subsequently) to enable it.



### 3.1.6 Development >> Monitoring

**DEV.600: Log all relevant events**

*This mitigation is required to counter product usage that could be indicative of attacker activity*

The product **is required to log all events deemed of interest to an operator investigating a potential event or incident.**

Logs here are intended to cover event and information logs rather than diagnostic or debug logs. Log data must be detailed enough to allow forensic investigation during any incident management. Sensitive data such as passwords and keys must not be written to the logs.

Note that in producing a Tailored Security Characteristic for a specific product evaluation, the evaluators shall determine the specific events of interest for each element.

Events logged must include as a minimum:

- Authentication attempts
- Loss of connection with devices/loss of network connectivity (if available)
- Change of software or firmware versions
- Tamper events (if available)
- Change of configuration
- Change of time
- Deletion of logs (or log entries), including archiving of logs if this causes the deletion.

**DEV.601: Protect access to logs**

*This mitigation is required to counter modification of logging generation*

*This mitigation is required to counter sanitisation of illegitimate access from logs*

The product is required to ensure that all log entries are time stamped.

Timestamps must be accurate and synchronised with a reliable time source. The deployment must take measures to ensure this.

The product is required to ensure that only an authenticated administrator can manage logs.

Only an authenticated administrator should be able to read log entries.

The product is required to ensure that no modification of log entries is allowed.

It must not be possible to delete log entries. Some simple devices with memory constraints may treat the log as circular, causing older entries to be overwritten by the latest entry if the log is full; in this case the log must be capable of holding at least 100 entries and must be exported to another device (such as a controller or central logging facility) regularly enough that log entries are unlikely to be lost. The overwriting of log entries in this way is acceptable provided that the developer supplies a valid justification for this behaviour, the size of the log and the frequency of export.

The product is required to alert the administrator before overwriting logs.

In order to avoid the loss of log files, the administrator should have the opportunity to ensure that log files have been exported or backed up in sufficient time before they are overwritten.

**DEV.602: Export logs**

*This mitigation is required to counter modification of locally stored logs*

The product is required to provide the ability to automatically transfer log records to an external device.

This functionality could be provided by a host operating system, where available. Log records shall be transferred as soon as possible after creation. Logs shall be transferred for archiving and possibly also analysis, which would be facilitated by the use of a common format such as syslog.

The product is required to protect the integrity of log records in transit.

**DEV.604: Record when device last seen**

*This mitigation is required to counter product usage that could be indicative of attacker activity*

The product is required to be able to identify when a connected device was last seen.

A device (such as a controller) that has contact with other devices must be able to identify when it last had contact with another device.

Where a device has not been seen for a period above a preset (possibly configurable) limit, a log record must be generated identifying the device that has not been seen. The trigger limit is likely to vary depending on the type of device and appropriate periods of inactivity.

### 3.1.7 Development >> Cloud Services (External)

**DEV.700: Suitable cloud services**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of insecure cloud services*

The product **is required to** ensure that cloud services meet NCSC Cloud Security Principles.

If the product uses external cloud services, the developer must state how they meet the NCSC Cloud Security Principles as defined in the NCSC Cloud security guidance [Cloud]. The cloud service provider must have published their response to the NCSC Cloud Security Principles.

Note that in producing a Tailored Security Characteristic for a specific product evaluation, the evaluators shall include an identification of the services and assets that are to be deployed using external cloud services.

## 3.2 Verification mitigations

### 3.2.1 Verification >> General

#### VER.100: Evaluation/Cryptocheck

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of a cryptographic algorithm implementation error*

The evaluator **will** ensure that all cryptographic algorithms employed for security functionality have been validated as per the 'Cryptography Review' section in the NCSC CPA Process for Performing Foundation Grade Evaluations document [PPFGE].

The evaluator shall include in this activity a confirmation (by reference to relevant CAVP or equivalent certificates) that component cryptographic primitives have been independently validated for correctness.

Where cryptographic algorithms claim certification under CAVP (or equivalent external certification), then the evaluator shall confirm that this certification has been achieved for the relevant hardware/firmware/software components of the product, at the relevant version for the component.

Where cryptographic algorithms have not been certified under CAVP (or equivalent external certification), the developers must discuss the suitability with CPNI before the product evaluation commences. CPNI will confirm the suitability of the implementation with NCSC before the evaluation can proceed.

This must include all cryptographic algorithms used in communications protocols.

The evaluators shall verify that the product does not include any other cryptographic algorithms that have not been validated.

#### VER.106: Updateable product

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of a known or discovered software implementation/logic error*

The evaluator **will** ensure that the product supports the use of software updates.

The evaluator will demonstrate that a successful update can be performed.

#### VER.107: Secure software delivery

*This mitigation is required to counter installing compromised software*

The evaluator **will** ensure that the product rejects update attempts using software with missing or invalid proof of authenticity.

Software for the initial installation and also for subsequent updates must be signed in such a way that it can be verified before installation or before an update is applied.

In exceptional cases, such as a Low Functioning device, software installation or updating may not be feasible. In such cases suitable rationales must have been examined under DEV.106 and DEV.107.

### 3.2.2 Verification >> Physical Security

**VER.200: Disable non-operational logical and physical interfaces**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of insecure internal or external interfaces*

The evaluator **will verify the state of each disabled interface.**

All disabled interfaces present in the operational state of the device (after installation) shall be identified and the disabled state of each shall be verified to confirm that it is not possible to use the interface. The evaluator will ensure that justification has been provided that any interface that is not disabled is required during normal operation. Physical interfaces include removable media.

The evaluator **will verify that disabled interfaces can only be re-enabled using multi-factor authentication or after breach of the tamper boundary resulting in a visible physical change, and an alert sent on (or before) use of the interface.**

Authentication must use credentials that are unique per device.

**VER.201: Tamper response**

*This mitigation is required to counter access to structures inside the tamper-protection boundary of the device*

The evaluator **will validate the developer's assertions regarding tamper response.**

The evaluator shall verify by testing that removing or opening any part of the tamper-protection boundary that is designed to be separately removed or opened shall be detectable and cause an alert and a log entry. The alert may be indicated by various means such as an alarm or flashing indicator or an alert raised at a connected controller when the connection is lost.

Attempts to tamper with a device that is not designed to be opened should be detectable and result in an alert and log entry being caused.

End user devices that are protected by appropriate measures specified in [EUD] guidance (and servers or other high functioning devices implementing equivalent measures) to encrypt local data, such as Bitlocker, are not required to generate a tamper alert but their disconnection from a controller must be alerted by the controller.

**VER.202: Fail secure on power loss**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation by removing power*

The evaluator **will verify that the product remains secure in the event of power loss.**

The evaluator shall confirm that, in the event of a loss of power, the failure of the device does not undermine the security requirements or cause other devices to fail or behave in a way that undermines the security requirements.

The evaluator shall confirm that, when power is restored after a failure, the device restarts in a state that does not undermine the security requirements or cause other devices to fail or behave in a way that undermines the security requirements.

**VER.203: Protection of security-related physical structure**

*This mitigation is required to counter unauthorised physical access to security-critical data stored on the device*

The evaluator **will confirm the tamper-protection boundary**.

The evaluator shall confirm that the outer casing of the device is a metal, hard plastic, or equivalent Production Grade enclosure. The device casing shall not allow inspection or visibility of the internal layout or components of the device, other than by breach of the tamper-protection boundary, and shall therefore be opaque within the visible spectrum (other than areas required for a sensor or to provide visibility of a user interface). This may be achieved by the case itself or by a lining applied to the case.

End user devices that are protected by appropriate measures specified in [EUD] guidance (and servers or other high functioning devices implementing equivalent measures) to encrypt local data, such as Bitlocker, are not required to have a tamper-protection boundary.

### 3.2.3 Verification >> Secure Configuration

**VER.300: Provide a configuration tool to enforce required settings**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of an accidental misconfiguration*

The evaluator **will** confirm that the configuration tool, or other method, initially sets the product up into a suitable configuration.

The evaluator will employ the tool, policy template, or specific configuration guide to ensure that it works successfully and results in a configuration of the product that meets the requirements.

**VER.301: Ensure product security configuration can only be altered by an authenticated system administrator**

*This mitigation is required to counter unauthorised alteration of product's configuration*

The evaluator **will** confirm that only authenticated administrators are able to change the product's security enforcing settings.

**VER.302: Ensure product security configuration can be backed up**

*This mitigation is required to counter unauthorised alteration of product's configuration*

The evaluator **will** confirm that the product's security enforcing settings can be securely backed up and restored.

The evaluator will confirm that backup and restore can only be carried out by an appropriately authorised administrator.

### 3.2.4 Verification >> Network Security

**VER.400: Minimise interfaces**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of a non-operational interface through crafted input*

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of an operational interface through crafted input*

The evaluator **will** confirm that only necessary protocols and services are available on the device.

The evaluator will verify that the only network ports and services open on the device are those that are necessary for operation of the device as claimed by the developer.

**VER.401: Wireless network must be secured**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of unsecured wireless network*

The evaluator **will** confirm that wireless networks are secured.

The evaluator will confirm that wireless technologies used by the product enforce the use of suitable security mechanisms to protect the communications channels. WiFi connections must use WPA2 Enterprise as a minimum. Where the use of Bluetooth or other wireless networking protocols is unavoidable, the product must enforce the use of secure protocols at higher levels in the communications stack to provide encryption and authentication protection such as TLS, employing NIST approved cryptographic algorithms.

Where wireless capability of a product is required to be disabled, the evaluator will confirm that, when they have taken the relevant action to disable a wireless interface, the interface is in fact disabled.

**VER.402: Use whitelist to limit communications**

*This mitigation is required to counter messages from unauthorised devices*

The evaluator **will** verify that the whitelist is used if available.

If the product offers a whitelist feature such as MAC filtering, or [IEEE802.1X], the evaluator will verify that a device that is not whitelisted cannot connect.

**VER.403: Use time synchronisation**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of variations in time between devices*

The evaluator **will** verify that time synchronisation is used to ensure all devices have a reference time source.

The time synchronisation can be obtained from an external time server or an internal time server with a trusted time source, using a suitable protocol such as NTP or PTP. This must only use a major version that is still supported, for which all up to date security patches have been applied. Where the time can be set on a device directly, the evaluators will verify that this can only be performed by an authorised and authenticated security administrator. Where the time is obtained from a time server, the evaluators will verify that the time on a device is synchronised with the time server. Where multiple protocols are supported for establishing a connection with the time server, the evaluators shall repeat test for each supported protocol.



**VER.404: Use segregated networks**

*This mitigation is required to counter an attack through a connected network*

The evaluator **will** verify that the network setup uses segregated networks.

If the product is supplied with network setup, the evaluators will verify that this uses VLANs or other network segregation approaches to separate unrelated components. As a minimum, the evaluators will verify that any management interface is on a separate VLAN.

**VER.405: General resource management**

*This mitigation is required to counter a DoS attack from a network interface*

The evaluator **will** verify that the device's behaviour is stable when processing incoming network traffic.

The evaluator shall confirm by testing that large amounts of incoming network traffic do not cause the device to crash or suffer a general failure resulting in a denial of service (either through implementation weakness or simple resource exhaustion).

**VER.406: Encrypt communications traffic over untrusted link**

*This mitigation is required to counter interception of data from unencrypted links*

The evaluator **will** verify that sensitive data is encrypted on untrusted communications links.

The evaluator will examine the content of captured traffic to confirm that sensitive data is suitably encrypted.

**VER.407: Protocol robustness testing**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of a non-operational interface through crafted input*

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of an operational interface through crafted input*

The evaluator **will** analyse fuzz testing results for the available interfaces.

Fuzz testing is described in more detail in the Process for Performing Foundation Grade Evaluations [PPFGE], and additional information is given in the CAPSS Application Notes. The fuzz testing evidence analysed by the evaluators may be generated by the evaluator, the developer, or a combination of both. Interfaces that are disabled and that cannot be directly accessed without physical modification involving breach of the tamper-protection boundary are not included in the scope of fuzz testing.

If the product includes separate components with inter-component interfaces between the components that provide a channel between them partially or entirely outside the secure enclave, then these inter-component interfaces shall be included in the scope of fuzz testing.

### 3.2.5 Verification >> Authentication Management (Privileges)

**VER.501: User least privilege**

*This mitigation is required to counter taking advantage of existing user privilege*

The evaluator **will** verify that the product will operate correctly from a standard account with the minimum privileges required for the user's role.

If the configuration of users is set up by a configuration tool supplied with or as part of the product, the evaluator shall examine the account privileges set up for each user role to determine whether only the privileges required for that role have been assigned.

If the configuration is not set automatically, the evaluator will verify that, following installation according to the deployment guidance, the account privileges set up for each user role have been assigned only the privileges required for that role.

**VER.502: User authentication**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of weak user passwords*

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of unattended workstations*

The evaluator **will** test that the password policy defined by an administrator is enforced.

If a MFA authentication mechanism is not in use for non-admin users, the evaluators shall verify that the defined password policy (meeting the requirements in Appendix C of this document) is enforced.

The evaluator **will** verify that sessions are locked after a defined period of inactivity, requiring the user to re-authenticate.

**VER.504: Local management authentication**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of poorly protected management interfaces*

The evaluator **will** verify that admin users must use a MFA authentication mechanism that is unique to each user.

**VER.505: Remote management authentication**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of poorly protected management interfaces*

The evaluator **will** verify that remote management access is protected using a secure protocol, such as IPsec, SNMPv3, TLS or SSH with MFA authentication.

The evaluators shall verify that remote access is disabled by default and requires specific action during installation (or subsequently) to enable it.

### 3.2.6 Verification >> Monitoring

**VER.600: Log all relevant events**

*This mitigation is required to counter product usage that could be indicative of attacker activity*

The evaluator **will** test that the log includes all events deemed of interest.

The evaluator will test that appropriate events are written to a log, based on those events identified for DEV.600.

**VER.601: Protect access to logs**

*This mitigation is required to counter modification of logging generation*

*This mitigation is required to counter sanitisation of illegitimate access from logs*

The evaluator **will** verify that all log entries are time stamped.

The evaluator will confirm that timestamps are synchronised to a reliable reference time source.

The evaluator **will** verify that only an authenticated administrator can manage logs.

The evaluator **will** verify that no modification of log entries is allowed.

This includes confirmation that it is not possible to delete log entries.

The evaluator **will** verify that the administrator is alerted before logs are overwritten.

**VER.604: Record when device last seen**

*This mitigation is required to counter product usage that could be indicative of attacker activity*

The evaluator **will** verify that it is recorded when a connected device was last seen.

The evaluator shall confirm that it is possible to identify when a connected device was last seen. Where a device has not been seen for a period above a preset (possibly configurable) limit, a log record must be generated identifying the device that has not been seen. The trigger limit is likely to vary depending on the type of device and appropriate periods of inactivity.

### 3.2.7 Verification >> Cloud Services (External)

**VER.700: Suitable cloud services**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of insecure cloud services*

The evaluator **will verify that cloud services meet NCSC Cloud Security Principles.**

If the product uses external cloud services, they must meet the NCSC Cloud Security Principles as defined in the NCSC Cloud security guidance [Cloud]. The evaluators will confirm that the product uses the cloud services in accordance with the cloud service provider's response to the NCSC Cloud Security Principles.

### 3.3 Deployment mitigations

These mitigations are expected to be met by deployment guidance provided by the developer and checked by the evaluator. The guidance could be provided in separate documents for different stakeholders (such as installers, administrators, end-users).

#### 3.3.1 Deployment >> General

**DEP.105: Encrypt sensitive data**

*This mitigation is required to counter extraction of sensitive data held on the device*

The deployment **is required to ensure that sensitive data is stored using encrypted data protection functions of the host platform.**

Devices containing sensitive data must be configured to use the protection afforded by mechanisms such as BitLocker or equivalents. Refer to [\[EUD\]](#) for specific guidance for end-user devices.

If devices that contain sensitive data are removed from the secure enclave (e.g. for specialist analysis) then this must be done under procedural controls that minimise the specific risks to the deployment.

**DEP.106: Updateable product**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of a known or discovered software implementation/logic error*

The deployment **is required to regularly update to the latest version.**

For critical vulnerabilities the update must be applied within 14 days of the update becoming available. The product's deployment guidance must make clear where and how an administrator is to be made aware of update availability and obtain them.

**DEP.110: Administrator authorised updates**

*This mitigation is required to counter installing compromised software using the update process*

The deployment **is required to confirm the source of updates before they are applied to the system.**

The administrator is required to have authorised the updates before use. If an automatic process is used, the administrator must also configure the product to authenticate updates. The update procedure to be used by the administrator must be described within the product's deployment guidance.

### 3.3.2 Deployment >> Physical Security

**DEP.200: Disable non-operational logical and physical interfaces**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of insecure internal or external interfaces*

The deployment **is required to** include guidance on requirements to manage non-operational interfaces.

Physical interfaces include removable media.

**DEP.201: Tamper response**

*This mitigation is required to counter access to structures inside the tamper-protection boundary of the device*

The deployment **is required to** ensure that tamper alerts are collected.

If a device generates an alert it must be capable of being delivered and acted upon. Some simple devices with memory constraints may treat the log as circular, causing older entries to be overwritten by the latest entry if the log is full; in this case the log must be capable of holding at least 100 entries and must be exported to another device (such as a controller or central logging facility) regularly enough that log entries are unlikely to be lost.

**DEP.203: Protection of security-related physical structure**

*This mitigation is required to counter physical compromise of the device*

The deployment **is required to** employ tamper evident measures at access points on product.

Use tamper evidence measures (e.g. stickers) to make entry to system internals detectable by physical inspection. Measures such as tamper seals should be of restricted availability, or should require use of a special tool with restricted availability, to prevent an attacker successfully replacing one with a new, undamaged seal. CPNI approved tamper products (such as a CPNI Rated seal) should be used.

End user devices that are protected by appropriate measures specified in [EUD] guidance (and servers or other high functioning devices implementing equivalent measures) to encrypt local data, such as Bitlocker, are not required to have a tamper-protection boundary.

The deployment **is required to** provide advice on the tamper threat and tamper evidence inspection.

Advice should include looking for possible damage to tamper evident measures. In the event of tampering, the event should be reported as soon as possible and the product must be removed from use immediately. Any product that shows evidence of tampering must not be returned to service.

The deployment **is required to** implement physical security for secure area and secure enclave devices such that only an administrator can gain local access to the product (e.g. product sited in a locked room).

The deployment guidance must make it clear which devices need to be deployed in the secure area or secure enclave with appropriate physical protection.

**DEP.204: Physical security of management interfaces**

*This mitigation is required to counter physical compromise of management interfaces*

The deployment **is required to** ensure that management interfaces are not accessible in non-secure areas.

End user devices that are employed to access management interfaces must not be accessible in a non-secure area. Admin access to subsystems that are deployed within the secure enclave, must also be within the secure enclave. Admin access to subsystems that are deployed outside the secure enclave but within a secure area, may be within the same secure area.

### 3.3.3 Deployment >> Secure Configuration

**DEP.300: Provide a configuration tool to enforce required settings**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of an accidental misconfiguration*

The deployment **is required to** ensure that an administrator is provided with a configuration tool, or other method, to initially set it up into a suitable configuration.

The deployment guidance must ensure that an administrator is advised to perform the initial configuration using a supplied tool, policy template, or specific configuration guide to achieve this in as few steps as possible.

The deployment guidance must describe how an administrator can check that the deployment is in the evaluated configuration after initial installation and during subsequent operation.

The deployment guidance must describe any security assumptions for the environment (secure enclave/secure area/non-secure area) in which each component is intended to be deployed.

**DEP.302: Ensure product security configuration can be backed up**

*This mitigation is required to counter unauthorised alteration of product's configuration*

The deployment **is required to** ensure that the product's security enforcing settings can be securely backed up.

The deployment guidance must ensure that an administrator is advised to use the product's features to securely backup their configuration, and provided with guidance on the process of restoring the security configuration in a timely fashion in the event of a failure.

**DEP.303: Deploy onto suitably protected endpoint**

*This mitigation is required to counter malware on endpoint*

The deployment **is required to** configure endpoints in line with good IT practice as part of a risk-managed accredited system.

If the endpoint device is provided with the product, configuration guidance must be provided equivalent to the relevant NCSC EUD Guidance. If the endpoint device is not provided with the product, the relevant security guidance for end user devices provided at [EUD] must be followed where possible.



### 3.3.4 Deployment >> Network Security

**DEP.401: Wireless network must be secured**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of unsecured wireless network*

The deployment **is required to** ensure that wireless networks are secured

The product documentation, and any CSE entry for the product, shall identify and describe its use of wireless technology and shall identify any wireless capabilities that are required to be disabled to meet the requirements of its Tailored Security Characteristic.

If the product uses wireless technologies, it must be configured to use suitable security mechanisms to protect the communications channels. WiFi connections must use WPA2 Enterprise as a minimum. Where the use of Bluetooth or other wireless networking protocols is unavoidable, this means enforcing the use of secure protocols at higher levels in the communications stack to provide encryption and authentication protection such as TLS, employing NIST approved cryptographic algorithms.

Wireless technologies must not be used on any site requiring more than a basic level of protection (see DEP.408).

Where wireless capabilities need to be disabled, the product documentation shall describe how to carry out this disabling, and how the disabled status can be checked at any point.

**DEP.402: Use whitelist to limit communications**

*This mitigation is required to counter messages from unauthorised devices*

The deployment **should** ensure that device whitelists are correctly configured.

If the product uses a whitelist feature (such as MAC filtering, or [IEEE802.1X]) the deployment guide must provide advice on how to correctly configure this during installation.

**DEP.403: Use time synchronisation**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of variations in time between devices*

The deployment **is required to** establish a reference time source.

Devices will use the time source to ensure time synchronisation. If this is not part of the product, the deployment guidance must provide advice on how this can be implemented and configured. This must only use a major version that is still supported, for which all up to date security patches have been applied.

**DEP.404: Use segregated networks**

*This mitigation is required to counter an attack through a connected network*

The deployment **is required to** use segregated networks.

Deployment guidance must state how the product can be configured using segregated networks (e.g. using VLANs). If the product is supplied with network setup, this should use VLANs or other network segregation approaches to separate unrelated components. As a minimum, any management interface must be on a separate VLAN.

**DEP.408: Do not deploy wireless technology at sites requiring more than a basic level of protection**

*This mitigation is required to counter a Denial of Service attack*

*This mitigation is required to counter identification of a device through network advertising*

*This mitigation is required to counter a man-in-the-middle attack on device communications*

The deployment **is required to** ensure that all device communications occur over wired network connections in a CNI site requiring more than a basic level of protection.

Wireless networks must not be used on any site requiring more than a basic level of protection.

### 3.3.5 Deployment >> Authentication Management (Privileges)

**DEP.500: Role based access control**

*This mitigation is required to counter privilege escalation on management application*

*This mitigation is required to counter unauthorised use of management privilege*

The deployment **is required to** enforce separate accounts for device management, account administration and user access.

The deployment guidance should identify what each role allows to be performed, so that users can be assigned to specific appropriate roles.

**DEP.501: User least privilege**

*This mitigation is required to counter taking advantage of existing user privilege*

The deployment **is required to** ensure that users are provided with a standard account with the minimum privileges required for the user's role.

The deployment guidance should identify the (OS and/or product-defined) privileges required for each user role, enabling the system administration to ensure that unnecessary privileges are not assigned to users.

**DEP.502: User authentication**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of weak user passwords*

The deployment **is required to** enforce a password policy that requires passwords to be changed upon suspicion that a password has been compromised.

The password policy must be at least as robust as that defined in Appendix C of this document. No previous password shall be allowed by the product, in case they have been breached.

The deployment **is required to** ensure that default passwords are changed at installation.

Default passwords must be changed, at installation, to passwords that comply with the password policy. An installation will not be considered CAPSS compliant if the default passwords have not been changed. Note that in future versions of this SC, this requirement may be strengthened to require the product to enforce the change of passwords at installation.

**DEP.503: One administrator per account**

*This mitigation is required to counter the unauthorised use of an admin account*

The deployment **is required to** use one admin account per administrator.

The deployment guidance should prohibit two or more users using the same user account.

**DEP.504: Local management authentication**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of poorly protected management interfaces*

The deployment **is required to** authenticate any local management interface using MFA authentication.

The deployment guidance must specify the use of MFA authentication for admin users.

**DEP.505: Remote management authentication**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of poorly protected management interfaces*

The deployment **is required to** authenticate any remote management interface using a secure protocol, such as IPsec, SNMPv3, TLS or SSH with MFA authentication.

The deployment guidance must specify that remote access be protected by a secure protocol and MFA authentication.

The deployment guidance must specify that remote access is disabled by default and identify the specific actions required during installation (or subsequently) to enable it.

### 3.3.6 Deployment >> Monitoring

**DEP.600: Log all relevant events**

*This mitigation is required to counter suspicious product usage that could be indicative of attacker activity*

The deployment **should** where available, automatically export logs to a management device in a secure area.

The deployment **is required to** assess impact of log entries and follow organisational procedures for incident resolution.

The deployment **is required to** configure the product to log all actions deemed of interest.

Where the events to be logged are configured by an admin user, the deployment guidance must include information on how to configure the product to ensure that the events logged include as a minimum those identified for DEV.600.

**DEP.602: Export logs**

*This mitigation is required to counter modification of locally stored logs*

The deployment **is required to** provide the ability to automatically transfer log records to an external device.

The deployment guidance must advise an administrator to configure the product to automatically transfer logs to an external device and provide sufficient information to enable it to be configured.

The deployment **is required to** protect the integrity of log records in transit.

The deployment guidance must advise an administrator to ensure that the integrity of logs are protected in transit, and provide sufficient information to enable it to be configured.

**DEP.603: Audit log review**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of a software implementation/logic error*

The deployment **is required to** regularly review audit logs for unexpected entries.

**DEP.605: Synchronised event time-stamps**

*This mitigation is required to counter modification of logging generation*

The deployment **is required to** ensure that event time-stamps are synchronised with a reliable time-source.

### 3.3.7 Deployment >> Cloud Services (External)

**DEP.700: Suitable cloud services**

*This mitigation is required to counter exploitation of insecure cloud services*

The deployment **is required to** ensure that cloud services meet NCSC Cloud Security Principles.

If the product uses external cloud services, the deployment guidance must provide advice to ensure that the configuration meets the NCSC Cloud Security guidance [Cloud]. The cloud service provider must have published their response to the NCSC Cloud Security Principles.

# Appendix A – References

This document references the following resources.

Label	Title	Version	Date	Location	Reference
BS	NCSC CPA Build Standard	1.4	Oct 2018	<a href="https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/information/commercial-product-assurance-cpa">https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/information/commercial-product-assurance-cpa</a>	NCSC-1844117881-312
CEPlus	NCSC Cyber Essentials Plus			<a href="https://www.cyberessentials.ncsc.gov.uk">https://www.cyberessentials.ncsc.gov.uk</a>	
Cloud	NCSC Cloud security guidance		17 Nov 2018	<a href="https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/cloud-security">https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/cloud-security</a>	
Control_Room	CPNI Control Rooms Guidance		Dec 2016	<a href="https://www.cpni.gov.uk/system/files/documents/73/38/Control%20Rooms%20Guidance%20Dec%202016.pdf">https://www.cpni.gov.uk/system/files/documents/73/38/Control%20Rooms%20Guidance%20Dec%202016.pdf</a>	
EUD	Mobile Device Guidance <i>(this was formerly the 'End User Device Security Collection')</i>	1.0	22 Jan 2020	<a href="https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/mobile-device-guidance">https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/mobile-device-guidance</a>	
IEEE802.1X	IEEE Standard for Local and metropolitan area networks – Port-Based Network Access Control	2010	2010	<a href="https://standards.ieee.org/standard/802_1X-2010.html">https://standards.ieee.org/standard/802_1X-2010.html</a>	
IPsec_NCSC	NCSC Guidance – using IPsec to protect data		23 Sept 2016	<a href="https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/using-ipsec-protect-data">https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/using-ipsec-protect-data</a>	
ISO27001	Information Security Management Systems: Requirements	2013	2013	<a href="https://www.iso.org/isoiec-27001-information-security.html">https://www.iso.org/isoiec-27001-information-security.html</a>	
ISO29147	<i>Information technology – Security techniques – Vulnerability disclosure</i>	2018	2018	<a href="https://www.iso.org/standard/72311.html">https://www.iso.org/standard/72311.html</a>	
ISO30111	<i>Information technology – Security techniques – Vulnerability handling processes</i>	2019	2019	<a href="https://www.iso.org/standard/69725.html">https://www.iso.org/standard/69725.html</a>	
ISO9001	Quality Management Systems: Requirements	2015	2015	<a href="https://www.iso.org/iso-9001-quality-management.html">https://www.iso.org/iso-9001-quality-management.html</a>	
MISRA	MISRA C: 2012 – Guidelines for the use of C language in critical systems	2012	March 2013	<a href="https://misra.org.uk/">https://misra.org.uk/</a>	

Label	Title	Version	Date	Location	Reference
MISRA Comp	MISRA Compliance:2020 – Achieving compliance with MISRA Coding Guidelines	2020	February 2020	<a href="https://misra.org.uk/">https://misra.org.uk/</a>	
Pwned_NCSC	Suitable list of compromised passwords			<a href="https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/static-assets/documents/PwnedPasswordsTop100k.txt">https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/static-assets/documents/PwnedPasswordsTop100k.txt</a>	
PPFGE	Process for Performing CPA Foundation Grade Evaluations	2.5	Oct 2018	<a href="https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/information/commercial-product-assurance-cpa">https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/information/commercial-product-assurance-cpa</a>	NCSC-1844117881-485
SP 800-63B	NIST Special Publication 800-63B – NIST Digital Identity Guidelines – <i>Authentication and Lifecycle Management</i>		June 2017 Including updates as of March 2020	<a href="https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-63b.pdf">https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-63b.pdf</a>	
TLS_NCSC	NCSC Guidance – using TLS to protect data		17 Dec 2017	<a href="https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/tls-external-facing-services">https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/tls-external-facing-services</a>	

# Appendix B – Glossary

The following definitions are used in this document.

Term	Definition
AACS	Automated Access Control System
AACS Controller	Back office system which controls the AACS
CAPSS	Cyber Assurance of Physical Security Systems
CCTV	Closed Circuit Television
CNI	Critical National Infrastructure
CPA	Commercial Product Assurance
Device	A physically distinct part of a product. Some products may consist of only one device.
DoS	Denial of Service
Element	A physically or logically distinct part of a system. An element may consist of a device or software (or both).
IA	Information Assurance
Low Functioning device	A device such as an FPGA/ASIC device, a simple circuit, or a simple device with very minimal firmware.
MFA	Multi-Factor Authentication
Non-secure area	An area that is not secured, such as public spaces and building exteriors.
NTP	Network Time Protocol
OS	Operating System
PIR	Passive Infrared
Product	The target of the evaluation. A product may consist of a single device, a subsystem or a system.
PTP	Precision Time Protocol, also known as IEEE 1588
SC	Security Characteristic
Secure area	A secured area with access limited to authorised personnel and escorted unauthorised personnel.
Secure enclave	A secured area with access limited to individually authorised personnel, no unescorted access for unauthorised personnel, with records of access. Typically a secure server room or secure control room. See [Control_Room] for guidance.
Security Characteristic	A standard which describes necessary mitigations which must be present in a completed product, its evaluation or usage, particular to a type of security product.



Term	Definition
Sensitive data	<p>Data which, if compromised, would undermine</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• the cyber security of the product, or</li><li>• the physical security of the site (or of assets that the product is supposed to protect according to its own requirements or requirements in its intended deployment environment), or</li><li>• a person's expectation of privacy.</li></ul> <p>This includes personal data (related to the person and their expectation of privacy), configuration data and cryptographic material such as keys and passwords.</p>
System	A group of related elements, especially when dedicated to a single application.
Subsystem	A self-contained system within a larger system.

# Appendix C – Password Policy

The following requirements are the minimum for an acceptable password policy.

- **The system will require the user to change the password when logging in for the first time.**
- **The password must be a minimum of nine characters in length.**
- **The password must have a maximum length of at least 64 characters.**
- **Account lock out shall be set at ten attempts or less (min of three).**
- **Passwords must not be:**
  - Passwords obtained from previous breach corpuses (by checking against an offline list obtained from a reliable source such as [\[Pwned NCSC\]](#)).
  - Dictionary words. (Where the whole password is a single dictionary word).
  - Three or more repetitive or sequential characters (e.g. 'aaa', '1234abcd').
  - Context-specific words, such as the name of the service, the username, and derivatives thereof.
- **Passwords should only be required to be changed upon suspicion that a password has been compromised. No previous password shall be allowed by the product (because they're suspected to have been breached)**
- **Passwords should be stored hashed and salted with a unique salt per password.**

For systems with remote access, MFA should be used in line with NIST requirements [\[SP 800-63B\]](#).

# Appendix D – Applying Mitigations

The mitigations identified in section 3 are generally intended to apply to all Physical Security System products and components. However it is recognised that in some deployment situations certain threats may not apply to some components of the PSS – for example, a low functioning device such as a PIR sensor will have different applicable threats compared to a high functioning server.

The relevance of each threat may vary according to the deployed location, the architecture and communications protocols of each specific product.

The tables below identify DEV, VER and DEP mitigations for which it may be allowable to accept a rationale as to why the mitigation has not been met.

The rationale must show that the relevant threat does not apply to the component given

- a) its level of functionality (i.e. whether it is a low functioning device), and
- b) the applicable threats in its deployment environment (e.g. a PIR sensor located in a non-secure area might not contain sensitive data and therefore might not have the threat ‘extraction of sensitive data’).

<b>Development Mitigations</b>	
DEV General	
101	Heap hardening
102	Stack protection
103	Data Execution Prevention
104	Address Space Layout Randomisation
105	Encrypt sensitive data
108	Protected software environment
DEV Secure Configuration	
303	Deploy onto suitably protected endpoint
DEV Network Security	
403	Use time synchronisation
404	Use segregated networks
405	General resource management
406	Encrypt communications traffic over untrusted link
DEV Authentication Management (Privileges)	
500	Role based access control
501	User least privilege

<b>Development Mitigations</b>	
502	User authentication
504	Local management authentication
505	Remote management authentication
DEV Monitoring	
600	Log all relevant events
601	Protect access to logs
602	Export logs
604	Record when device last seen
DEV Cloud Services (External)	
700	Suitable cloud services

<b>Verification Mitigations</b>	
403	Use time synchronisation
404	Use segregated networks
405	General resource management
406	Encrypt communications traffic over untrusted link
VER Authentication Management (Privileges)	
501	User least privilege
502	User authentication
504	Local management authentication
505	Remote management authentication
VER Monitoring	
600	Log all relevant events
601	Protect access to logs
604	Record when device last seen
VER Cloud Services (External)	
700	Suitable cloud services

<b>Deployment Mitigations</b>	
DEP General	
105	Encrypt sensitive data
106	Updateable product

<b>Deployment Mitigations</b>	
110	Administrator authorised updates
DEP Secure Configuration	
303	Deploy onto suitably protected endpoint
DEP Network Security	
403	Use time synchronisation
404	Use segregated networks
DEP Authentication Management (Privileges)	
500	Role based access control
501	User least privilege
502	User authentication
503	One administrator per account
504	Local management authentication
505	Remote management authentication
DEP Monitoring	
600	Log all relevant events
602	Export logs
603	Audit log review
605	Synchronised event time-stamps
DEP Cloud Services (External)	
700	Suitable cloud services

It is important to note that whenever the functionality referred to in a CAPSS requirement is provided by a component, then the evaluation of the product *must* include evaluation of that requirement and any related requirements.

This means that a product must implement a mitigation if:

- a) that mitigation is required, or
- b) the mitigation is not required but has been voluntarily implemented.

### Example 1

Regarding DEV.105: any device that contains sensitive data must implement sensitive data protection as in DEV.105 *Encrypt sensitive data*

Or

If no sensitive data is held on the device then DEV.105 can be limited to the details, and acceptance, of the rationale (which demonstrates the absence of sensitive data)

Or

When encryption is undertaken (whether required or not) this must be done in a manner compliant with DEV.100 *Evaluation/Cryptocheck* to confirm that the encryption and its implementation is robust.

### Example 2

If a device includes a stack then it is required to meet DEV.102 *Stack Protection*, but a Low Functioning device that is purely hardware and does not contain executable firmware, would not have a stack and therefore DEV.102 can be limited to the details, and acceptance, of the rationale (which demonstrates the absence of a stack).

Each component of a CAPSS submission must be examined against its own set of applicable threats when applying this methodology. It is not permissible to simply state “encryption not required” without justifying *why* the encryption is not required. Different rationales would therefore be expected for a low functioning device such as a PIR sensor, and a high functioning server.

The Tailored Security Characteristic for the product identifies which mitigations apply for a particular device and describes the scope of their application (e.g. a device might have some firmware that is updateable and some that is not, and this would determine the scope of DEV.106 for that device).

## Appendix E – Change history

This appendix describes the main changes made in the Security Characteristic starting from CAPSS 2019 as the baseline.

### E.1 CAPSS 2019 to CAPSS 2021 v1.0

(Note that no separate CAPSS 2020 version was published.)

The approach to determining relevant mitigations for a component has been revised in CAPSS 2021. The intent has generally been to maintain the same requirements but to make it clearer how to determine relevant mitigations for each target part of the PSS. This high-level change has the following elements:

- The table in CAPSS 2019 SC Appendix D has been replaced with a list of mitigations for which a rationale may in some cases be accepted to show that the mitigation is not required.
- The use of variants (and therefore the associated section) has been removed from the SC.
- Additional guidance on determining the applicability of a mitigation has been added in the Application Notes.

The term ‘highly constrained device’ has been replaced with ‘low functioning device’ (previously both were used with effectively the same meaning).

The definition of sensitive data, and its use in DEV.105 has been updated.

The requirements for protection of debug interfaces in DEV.200 (and VER.200) have been modified to identify alternatives to MFA.

Notes have been added to draw attention to the following:

- servers and other high functioning devices need to implement equivalent measures to those in [EUD]
- wireless may not be used on sites requiring more than a basic level of protection (this was already noted in DEP.401, but additional notes have been included in other places where wireless is mentioned)

DEP.300 now requires a description of how an administrator can check that the deployment is in the evaluated configuration after initial installation and during subsequent operation, and documentation of secure area assumptions related to each component.

DEP.401 now requires product documentation and CSE entries to note any necessary use of wireless by the PSS. Where wireless is present but must be disabled to meet CAPSS requirements this must also be documented, and VER.401 requires evaluator testing to confirm that the interface is actually disabled by the documented action.

References have been updated, including replacing the previous NCSC guidance on 'End User Devices' with guidance for 'Mobile Devices'. However, the term 'End User Device' has been retained for CAPSS 2021.

## **E.2 CAPSS 2021 v1.0 to CAPSS 2021 v1.1**

Additional information on order of undertaking CPNI functional standard or CPNI CAPSS evaluations has been added in this updated CAPSS 2021 v1.1, but no changes have been made to the mitigations. Additional interpretations and clarifications can be found in the CAPSS 2021 v1.1 Application Notes.