CSE Doors Chapter: Marauding Terrorist Attacks

Last Updated 27 April 2021
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CSE Doors Chapter: Marauding Terrorist Attacks

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Essential Reading

Introduction

Research conducted by NPSA has demonstrated steel doorsets have the potential to offer a significant delay to forced entry by marauding attackers using bladed weapons, firearms or placing explosive devices in contact with the doorset. 

Products

Timber, Steel, Hinged and Pivoted Glazed doorsets have the capacity to delay progress by marauding attackers in accordance with NPSA’s Marauding Terrorist Attack Standard (MTAS). Successful products are awarded a sophistication level of either BASIC, LOW, MODERATE, HIGH and EXPERT. Please refer to https://www.npsa.gov.uk/resources/introduction-marauding-terrorist-attack-standard-mtas

MTAS focusses on the delay a barrier can afford against the attacks stated above.  It does not consider the ease with which barriers can be secured and unlocked to aid escape. It is therefore extremely important to understand how easily a barrier can be secured and unlocked to aid escape.

NPSA have assessed several doorsets that meet NPSA’s manual forced entry standard (MFES). These are listed in the Catalogue of Security Equipment. (Click button to enter CSE pages for MFES doorsets).  These products have also been awarded sophistication levels in accordance with MTAS.   

NPSA also conducted trials on several timber specimens representative of generic construction offering a range of functionalities.   NPSA also conducted trials on several lighter duty steel doorsets.

NPSA identified the following design features that may delay attackers’ progress sufficiently to allow people to alleviate themselves from danger.
 

Steel Doorsets

  • Steel doorsets incorporating leaves formed using 1.5 mm thick steel skins with corrugated board or mineral wool cores have the potential to deliver at least the following delay to marauding attack when secured using a single point mortice sash lock:
    - 3 minutes to BASIC sophistication (bladed weapon) attacks
    - 0.5 minutes to LOW sophistication ballistic forced entry (BFES) attacks
    - 0.5 minutes to MODERATE sophistication energetic forced entry (EFES) attacks.
  • Steel doorsets incorporating leaves formed using 1.5 mm thick steel skins  with corrugated board or mineral wool cores have the potential to deliver at least the following delay to marauding attack when secured using a multi-point surface mounted lock:
    - 3 minutes to BASIC sophistication (bladed weapon) attacks
    - 3 minutes to LOW sophistication ballistic forced entry (BFES) attacks.
    - 2 minutes to MODERATE sophistication ballistic forced entry (BFES) attacks using either a handgun or shotgun.
    -1 minute to MODERATE sophistication ballistic forced entry (BFES) attacks using a rifle or HIGH sophistication ballistic forced entry (BFES) attacks.
    - 0.5 minutes to MODERATE sophistication energetic forced entry (EFES) attacks.

Reinforcing leaves and jambs can significantly enhance their resistance to forced entry attacks – particularly their resistance to ballistic forced entry (hardened steels) and energetic forced entry (hardened steel and laminated timber cores).

NPSA has not been able to evaluate every variant of steel doorset currently on the market to award each product a MTAS sophistication level.  

 

Timber Doorsets

  • Outward opening timber doorsets generally afford greater resistance to forced entry than inward opening timber doorsets.
  • Doorsets formed using solid hardwood leaves provide greater resistance than those formed with leaves containing either particleboard or hollow cores.
  • Doorsets formed using solid rebated jambs provide greater resistance than those formed using softwood frames or jambs incorporating planted stops.
  • Outward opening timber doorsets formed using 44 m thick solid hardwood leaves and solid rebated hardwood jambs have the potential to deliver at least 1 minute resistance to a BASIC sophistication (bladed weapon) attack when secured using a two-point surface mounted panic exit systems complying with the EN 1125 Building hardware. Panic exit devices operated by a horizontal bar, for use on escape routes. Requirements and test methods.
  • Outward opening timber doorsets formed using 44 mm thick solid hardwood leaves and solid rebated hardwood jambs have the potential to deliver at least 5 minutes resistance to a BASIC sophistication (bladed weapon) attack when secured using one of the following types of single-point morticed access control locking devices:
    - Motorised deadlock.
    -Solenoid deadlock.
    - Mortice sash lock with electronic strike plate.
  • Fitting a pair of mortice bolts 1/3 and 2/3 along the leading edge of a solid 44 mm thick hardwood door leaf has the potential to enable the doorset to deliver at least the following delay against BASIC sophistication (bladed weapon) attacks:
    - Outward opening doorset (2 minutes).
    - Inward opening doorset (5 minutes).
  • Timber doorsets formed using 54 mm thick solid hardwood leaves and solid rebated hardwood jambs have the potential to deliver at least the following resistance to BASIC sophistication (bladed weapon) attacks when secured using a mortice sash lock in combination with an electronic strike plate:
    -Outward opening (5 minute).
    -Inward opening (1 minute).
  • Outward opening timber doorsets formed using 54 mm thick solid hardwood leaves and solid rebated hardwood jambs have the potential to deliver at least the following resistance to attack when secured using one of the following types of single point surface mounted access control locking devices:
    - 24V shear lock (1 minute to a BASIC sophistication (bladed weapon) level attack).
    - 24V electromagnetic lock (3 minutes to a BASIC sophistication (bladed weapon) level attack).
    - Solenoid lock (5 minutes to a BASIC sophistication (bladed weapon) level attack and at least 30 seconds to a LOW sophistication ballistic forced entry (BFES) attack).
  • Inward opening timber doorsets formed using 54 mm solid hardwood leaves and solid rebated hardwood jambs have the potential to deliver at least the following resistance to attack when secured using a single point surface mounted solenoid lock:
    - 5 minutes to a BASIC sophistication (bladed weapon) level attack 
    - 30 seconds to a LOW sophistication ballistic forced entry (BFES) attack.
  • Fitting a pair of flush bolts within the protected side of a 54 mm thick solid hardwood door leaf has the potential to enable:
    - An outward opening doorset to achieve at least a 5 minute delay against a BASIC sophistication (bladed weapon) attack.|
    - An inward opening doorset to achieve at least a 10 minute delay against a BASIC sophistication (bladed weapon) attack and a 30 second delay against a LOW sophistication ballistic forced entry (BFES) attack. 

 

Hinged and Pivoted Glazed Entrance Doorsets 

NPSA have identified hinged and pivoted glazed entrance doorsets have the capacity to delay progress by marauding attackers in accordance with NPSA’s Marauding Attack Test Standard (MTAS). Successful products are awarded a sophistication level of either BASIC, LOW, MODERATE, HIGH and EXPERT.

MTAS focusses on the delay a barrier can afford against the attacks stated above.  It does not consider the ease with which barriers can be secured and unlocked to aid escape. It is therefore extremely important to understand how easily a barrier can be secured and unlocked to aid escape.

NPSA has not been able to evaluate every variant of hinged and pivoted entrance doorset currently on the market to award each product a MTAS sophistication level.  However, the following design features will mitigate the progress of attackers to ensure people can alleviate themselves from danger: 

  • Doorsets incorporating at least two locking morticed points have the potential to offer significantly greater resistance to marauding attacks than those secured by a single lock or in a single location.
  • Lock bolts should engage directly into either a keep formed in a sill or a keep formed within other jambs. Keeps formed within strips that clip into a jamb profile may be susceptible to coming away from the jamb during attempts to lever or impact the leading edge of the door leaf.
  • Doorsets incorporating single panes of laminated glazing offer greater resistance to marauding attacks than those fitted with plain glass or glass with an anti-shatter film applied to the rear. In those cases, the laminated glass used should be at least 10 mm thick with a PVB or SGP interlayer.
  • Doorsets incorporating sealed glazing units offer greater resistance if at least one face of the glazing unit is formed from laminated glass. In those cases, thicker laminates typically offer the greater resistance. However, at minimum, the following laminates have been demonstrated to offer some resistance to BASIC bladed weapon attacks:
    • 6.8 mm thick annealed laminated glass can be capable of resisting BASIC bladed weapon attacks for at least 30 seconds.
    • 7.5 mm thick annealed laminated glass can be capable of resisting BASIC bladed weapon attacks for at least 1 minute.

Further information can be found in the following NPSA guidance:

MTA Supplementary Guidance - Physical Barriers that delay and discourage attackers.

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